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 FOREWORD
Andrew Steer
President 
World Resources Institute
Until recently Brazil’s greenhouse gas emissions 
have been dominated by deforestation and land-use 
change. But good progress in reducing deforesta-
tion and rapid growth in energy use have shifted 
this balance so that emissions from land-use change 
and energy are roughly equal. This is leading to a 
greater focus on the potential role of the energy sec-
tor in Brazil’s transition to a low-carbon economy.
Bridging the Gap Between Energy and Climate 
Policies in Brazil: Policy Options to Reduce 
Energy-Related GHG Emissions assesses trends in 
Brazil’s energy sector and presents policy options 
for emissions reductions, with the goal of informing 
the national dialog on energy and climate change. 
The authors assess the impacts of existing energy 
and climate policies, as well as opportunities for 
further efficiency gains and emissions reductions, 
particularly in the post-2020 timeframe. 
Emissions from energy in Brazil have traditionally 
been low due to strong reliance on hydroelectricity. 
But recently, even while renewable-sourced energy 
continues to grow, fossil-based energy has been 
growing much faster, leading to a strong upward 
trend in emissions. The good news is that Brazil 
can reverse this trend. With nearly half of Brazil’s 
energy emissions now coming from transportation, 
the report finds that Brazil can make significant 
headway by tapping its vast renewable energy 
potential, modernizing its vehicles, and 
encouraging mass electrification and hybridization 
of its transportation fleet. Such efforts would 
not only make a major contribution to Brazil’s 
mitigation efforts, they would also deliver health 
co-benefits to its citizens and increase the livability 
and competitiveness of its cities. 
Recent research from many countries around  
the world has shown that a bold shift toward a  
low-carbon economy need not involve large 
incremental costs. On the contrary, done right, it 
can lead to accelerated technological change, more 
jobs, a better quality of life, and faster economic 
growth. Brazil can position itself as a leader in this 
historic transformation.
WRI.org        vi
        1Bridging the Gap Between Energy and Climate Policies in Brazil
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Brazil is facing a series of important policy decisions that will 
determine its energy future over the next several decades, with 
important implications for the country’s economic competitiveness, 
the well-being of its citizens, and the global climate. The decisions 
concern the direction of approximately 0.5 trillion U.S. dollars of 
anticipated investment in energy infrastructure over the next decade–
which can either lock in carbon-intensive infrastructure, or advance 
Brazil’s position as a leader in the low-carbon economy. 
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These decisions also include the role of large-scale 
hydropower projects, the pace of transition to mod-
ern renewables (biofuels that do not cause land-use 
change (LUC), biopower, wind power, solar power, 
and others), ambitious and widespread efficiency 
improvements, decentralized power generation, and 
its “smart” integration with the grid.
More recently, the economic crisis, a severe 
drought, regulatory uncertainty in the power 
sector, and management problems associated 
with the state-owned oil company have raised 
more concerns about investment diversion in the 
Brazilian energy sector. On the eve of the 21st 
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), global environmental concerns add 
another important dimension to Brazil’s national 
decision-making process.
Energy decisions must be made against the 
backdrop of several important trends intersecting 
energy and climate. First, global greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions are increasing at a rate that 
threatens imminently to exceed physical global 
limits. Second, even as Brazil makes strides in 
reducing deforestation rates, emissions from its 
energy sector are increasing rapidly, as the economy 
grows and the country relies more on fossil-fuel-
fired power generation—a departure from its 
history of relying primarily on renewable resources. 
As a result, Brazil will increasingly need to grapple 
with the climate implications of a sector that has 
historically enjoyed an especially large share of 
low-carbon energy sources. Under the UNFCCC, 
it becomes imperative that Brazil’s intended 
nationally determined contribution (INDC) for the 
2015 Paris Agreement should reflect the post-2020 
reality of the country’s emissions profile by taking 
on an ambitious national commitment that goes 
beyond forests and includes transformative actions, 
especially in the energy sector.
Therefore, Bridging the Gap Between Energy and 
Climate Policies in Brazil: Policy Options to Reduce 
Energy-Related GHG Emissions examines Brazil’s 
key energy-related GHG emitting sectors through 
a climate lens in order to offer recommendations 
for a more integrated approach that can more 
effectively reconcile energy and climate needs. 
Bridging the Gap Between Energy and Climate 
Policies in Brazil: Policy Options to Reduce 
Energy-Related GHG Emissions begins with an 
overview of Brazil’s past energy and GHG emissions 
profiles, current pledges and future trends, and a 
discussion of the implications for a possible allocation 
of the remaining global carbon budget. 
Next, it reviews available scenarios for Brazil’s 
energy-related GHG emissions in order to identify 
key drivers and results and compare them to a 
given allocation of the global carbon budget. It then 
focuses on the top-emitting subsectors—transport, 
industry, and power generation—to identify key 
abatement opportunities. The report concludes with 
recommendations regarding a portfolio of policies 
and measures that could achieve both climate and 
energy objectives. 
Findings
The current trajectory of Brazil’s energy-related GHG 
emissions is not consistent with least-cost pathways 
to avoiding dangerous levels of climate change. 
Although the allocation of the remaining carbon 
budget by country—and what Brazil’s share 
should be—is fundamentally a political question, 
the literature describes various approaches and 
proposals that are under consideration as possible 
means to determine Brazil’s economy-wide “fair 
share.” These approaches include historical 
responsibility, ethical allocation including rights of 
future generations, economic capability, and least 
possible cost (discussed in Annex 2). Generally, 
they present an upper emissions limit (a carbon 
budget) for Brazil’s non land-use change (LUC) 
sectors that ranges from approximately 20 to 26 
GtCO2e over the period 2010-2050. However, 
under current policies, Brazilian GHG emissions, 
especially energy-related GHG emissions, are likely 
to exceed that budget between 2024 and 2035.
GHG mitigation scenarios identify abatement 
opportunities for Brazil that are consistent with the 
need to limit global carbon emissions. 
A review of a range of modeling scenarios for 
Brazil’s future GHG emissions, including those 
produced by the International Energy Agency, 
McKinsey, the World Bank, and others, identifies 
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opportunities for reductions in Brazil’s energy-
related GHG emissions that are significantly greater 
than those identified in Brazil’s current energy 
plans. Many of these reductions would incur nega-
tive or low economic costs, with significant benefits 
in the form of energy security, mobility, health, and 
economic competitiveness.
Key abatement opportunities in energy-related 
GHG emissions exist primarily in the transport, 
industry, and power-generation sectors. 
The following recommendations can help Brazil 
take advantage of these opportunities:
 ▪ Improve fuel economy and invest in shifting to low-carbon modes of trans-
port. Transport is the largest contributor 
to energy-related GHG emissions in Brazil. 
Ambitious decarbonization of this sector can 
be achieved through the use of biofuels that 
do not cause negative land-use change, mass 
transportation, and non-motorized modes 
of transport. Appropriate regulatory signals 
and incentives can encourage the inclusion of 
advanced flex-fuel engine technologies, hybrids, 
and electrical vehicles in the energy transporta-
tion mix, as well as increase synergies between 
transport and power-generation. Fuel-economy 
standards in Brazil still lag in both stringency 
and implementation behind several other major 
economies. Likewise, with the exception of 
certain cities, Brazil has provided limited incen-
tives to date to encourage shifts toward more 
efficient transportation modes, including rail 
and bus rapid transit. A series of reforms at fed-
eral, state, and local levels could help accelerate  
this shift. 
 ▪ Create incentives and systems for im-
proving and gauging industrial efficiency 
by using carbon metrics. These measures 
include implementing the planned Brazilian 
Market for Emission Reductions, developing 
life-cycle-assessment-based benchmarks to 
differentiate low-carbon from more carbon-
intensive products: leveraging environmental 
licensing to improve efficiency; accelerating 
plans to switch to low-carbon fuels; and accel-
erating implementation of the measurement, 
reporting, and verification (MRV) system for 
industrial carbon emissions.
 ▪ Prioritize modern renewables, particularly solar and wind, while 
addressing the challenges concerning 
large hydropower projects. There are 
significant untapped opportunities for Brazil to 
foster the deployment of modern renewables 
and to promote their interconnection with the 
grid. It would be necessary to remove harmful 
incentives for fossil fuels, leveling the playing 
field so that alternative energy solutions can 
compete in a free market. A commitment to 
increase the share of solar and wind in the 
national energy mix to 30 percent by 2030, as 
part of Brazil’s intended nationally determined 
contribution (INDC), could be also a relevant 
strategy to advance the use of these clean 
energy sources. 
 ▪ Reconcile climate and energy policy and planning processes in national- and 
international-level policies. Climate and 
energy policy and planning processes need to 
be more thoroughly integrated in Brazil. In 
the energy sector, this implies acknowledging 
the constraints imposed by the global carbon 
budget—as well as the sizable risk and cost of 
locking in carbon-intensive energy sources—in 
planning processes such as the National Energy 
Plan and the Ten-Year Energy Expansion Plan. 
In the context of climate policy, it includes 
setting ambitious and feasible GHG mitigation 
goals that consider the full range of cost-
effective and beneficial abatement potential 
in the energy sector. Such goals set the pace 
of implementation, and address the practical 
challenges involved in transitioning to a 
sustainable low-carbon economy, including the 
need to grapple with intermittency challenges 
in modern renewables and the serious 
social and environmental issues concerning 
hydropower. Confronting the need to reconcile 
energy and climate priorities is the first step 
in mustering the political will and ingenuity 
necessary to overcome the barriers to the low-
carbon pathway.
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INTRODUCTION
The international climate negotiations have important implications 
for the way Brazil sources and uses energy. The size and expected 
growth of Brazil’s economy, combined with the carbon intensification 
of its energy mix, have growing consequences for climate change. 
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In turn, decreasing stability and predictability in 
weather patterns resulting from global climate 
change pose a serious threat to the country’s energy 
supply (EPE, 2014). Hydropower production 
and bioenergy crops depend on reliable water 
regimes. Wind power and solar energy have not 
been deployed at a sufficiently large scale and 
their integration is still an issue. Nuclear power is 
minimal and controversial. Fossil fuels are being 
considered as a short- and medium-term option, 
but the scale of foreseen investments in this 
sector is very likely to lock in the Brazilian energy 
infrastructure toward a long-term carbon-intensive 
pathway, inconsistent with climate-change 
mitigation goals. 
Although Brazil’s GHG emissions correspond to 
only about three percent of total global GHG emis-
sions, the country will play a prominent position 
in future international negotiations. However, it 
risks losing this prominence if it persists with the 
current policy of investing heavily in fossil fuels. 
It may also lose the competitiveness race to more 
innovative, efficient, and decarbonized economies. 
In this sense, the relationship between Brazil’s 
energy system and the global climate system makes 
it imperative that the country move toward an 
integrated approach to decision-making on these 
two key issues.
Historically, Brazil’s energy mix has been 
dominated by an exceptionally high share of 
renewable sources (hydropower and bioenergy); 
renewables reached 47 percent of the total primary 
energy supply in 2009 (EPE, 2010), whereas the 
average world share of renewables in primary 
energy supply is approximately 13 percent (IEA, 
2014). However, although the country still has 
a significant share of renewable sources in the 
energy mix—39.4 percent in 2014 (EPE, 2015)—and 
although renewables continue to grow in absolute 
terms, their share in the energy mix decreased 
by almost six percent over the past six years. 
Carbon-intensive forms of energy have gained a 
foothold in Brazil and are growing much faster than 
renewable energy sources, leading to an increase 
in the carbon intensity of the energy mix (MCTi, 
2013; SEEG, 2014; EPE, 2015). Between 2014 and 
2023, the government expects that more than 70 
percent of the nearly 0.5 trillion U.S. dollars in 
projected energy investments will be directed to 
fossil fuels. In 2013, land use, land-use change 
and forestry (LULUCF) was the largest GHG 
emitter, representing approximately 34.8 percent 
of national GHG emissions, while GHG emissions 
from fossil energy (28.8 percent) edged out those 
from agriculture (26.8 percent) (SEEG 2014).
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Under the Ministry of Energy (MME), the Energy 
Research Company (EPE) is the government 
research organization that handles long-term 
energy planning. EPE periodically issues the 
Long-term National Energy Plan (PNE), the annual 
National Energy Balance (BEN), and the annual 
Ten-Year Energy Expansion Plan (PDE), which 
together form the basis of Brazil’s energy policies. 
The most recent long-term planning document, 
the PNE 2030 (EPE, 2007), was published before 
the global financial crisis, the launch of Brazil’s 
national climate policy, and numerous other 
important developments. In a move to address the 
longer term, EPE is currently developing the 2050 
National Energy Plan. 
The 2050 PNE’s Terms of Reference (TOR), the 
energy-demand studies, and the economic scenar-
ios for the elaboration of the 2050 National Energy 
Plan have been already published. They take into 
consideration many issues and trade-offs facing 
the energy sector that will have implications for the 
country’s strategies to reduce energy-related GHG 
emissions: 
 ▪ The global financial crisis of 2008 and its 
continuing effects  ▪ Vulnerability of the hydro system due to climate 
change impacts 
 ▪ Inclusion of hybrids and electrical vehicles in 
the energy transportation mix  ▪ National capacity to store energy to take 
advantage of the endowment of intermittent 
energy sources, especially wind and solar ▪ Trade-offs between promoting natural gas 
versus non-traditional renewable sources ▪ Distributed power generation, the role of self-
generators, and implications for future power 
demand ▪ Role of thermal power plants running on 
biomass (instead of gas or coal)—including 
biomass from forests, which can fully 
substitute for fossil-fuel-fired power plants in a 
continuous process ▪ Advancement and improved competitiveness 
of bioenergy, regarding both biofuels and 
biopower ▪ Associated implications of bioenergy for land 
use ▪ Promotion of regional energy integration with 
bordering countries
However, the PNE 2050 does not take into account 
the rapid progress of modern renewables, and 
their integration and storage systems, which seem 
likely to become highly cost-competitive in the near 
future. Layered on top of these considerations is 
global climate change, but this issue has been only 
WRI.org        8
marginally discussed in the PNE 2050 preliminary 
documents as a driver for new technologies 
and necessary adaptive measures. The issue of 
compatibility with the global carbon budget is 
similarly neglected. 
The threat of climate change has implications 
for the resilience of Brazil’s energy sector and its 
economy more generally; it also implies limits 
to the amount of net GHG emissions that can 
safely be allowed at the global level. The Fifth 
Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2013) has made 
clear that current emissions trends threaten the 
integrity of the global climate system and that the 
time available for action to maintain safe levels of 
average global temperature rise is running out. To 
limit the average global temperature increase to 
2°C by the end of the century, cumulative global 
CO2 emissions should stay within a “budget” of 
approximately 990 (510–1505) GtCO2 over the 
period 2012–2100 (RCP2.6 scenarios, according to 
the IPCC, 2013). Scientists estimate that, ideally, 
global CO2 emissions will need to reach net zero 
between 2050 and 2070 (UNEP, 2014) and should 
become negative over the remainder of the century 
to offset previous emissions. Global GHG emissions 
will need to reach net zero between 2080 and 2100 
(IPCC, 2013). 
If current trends continue unabated, humankind 
will burn through this budget within the next 
30 years. How the remaining carbon budget is 
allocated by country—and what Brazil’s share 
should be—was not addressed in the IPCC AR5; 
it is fundamentally a political question, but there 
are various approaches and proposals under 
consideration in the literature that could be used 
to determine Brazil’s economy-wide “fair share.” 
These approaches include historical responsibil-
ity, ethical allocation including rights of future 
generations, economic capability, and least possible 
cost; they are discussed further in Annex 2 of this 
report. Policies and economic decisions made in 
the interest of pursuing such goals are likely to have 
serious implications for the economic viability of 
investments in fossil fuels vis a vis investments in 
a more rapid deployment of energy efficiency and 
renewables-related infrastructure. 
Objectives and Structure of the Report
The main objectives of this report are to:
 ▪ assess the key Brazilian energy-related GHG 
emitting sectors through a climate lens; ▪ present recommendations regarding how 
the Brazilian government could enhance 
implementation of existing energy policies; and ▪ identify potential policies that could effectively 
reconcile energy and climate needs in Brazil.
The report is focused on potential and realistic 
national policy recommendations that could assist 
the Brazilian government in promoting better 
integration of climate and energy considerations. It 
is based on the premise that most decarbonization 
and energy-efficiency efforts will occur at the 
necessary pace only with a strong policy signal 
to guide public and private investment. We have 
considered mostly specific sector-level approaches 
that the government could take to implement new 
policies, and to enhance effectiveness of existing 
policies, in order to reduce energy-related GHG 
emissions in Brazil.
The proposed policy recommendations address key 
energy-related GHG emission sectors (transport, 
industry, and power generation), as well as 
opportunities for improved integration between 
energy and climate policies. They are based on (i) 
policy literature specific to Brazil; (ii) international 
literature on best-practice policies in key energy 
sectors; (iii) analysis of existing GHG mitigation 
scenarios; and (iv) expert opinion elicited from 
energy and climate stakeholders. 
This section has introduced some of the key 
national and global factors that are affecting the 
Brazilian energy sector in the context of the need 
to constrain GHG emissions, and has outlined the 
methodological approach of the report. 
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Background and Context describes the changing 
profile of Brazil’s GHG emissions and discusses the 
implications of the global carbon budget for Brazil’s 
energy-related GHG emissions and the measures 
that might need to be taken by the government to 
contribute to the joint effort of limiting global tem-
perature rise to 2°C. 
Scenario Analysis presents available GHG mitiga-
tion scenarios concerning Brazil’s energy-related 
GHG emissions and analyzes their main findings 
in order to identify some key drivers of future GHG 
emissions and highlight key differences between 
those scenarios that are compatible with the 
global carbon budget and those that are not. It is 
important to note that this report compiles several 
different sources of information, from different 
dates. For this reason, base years may vary, as do 
the assumptions underlying different projections. 
Policy Implications examines the policy implica-
tions for Brazil’s energy subsectors with the highest 
GHG emissions—transport, industry, and power 
generation—and identifies technological options 
and key abatement opportunities. It discusses the 
practicality of these opportunities by looking at 
existing, available technologies and/or those that 
have not been widely implemented but present 
great potential to reduce GHG emissions. The sec-
tion identifies policies that would be consistent with 
implementing those technologies, and proposes 
recommendations to increase the effectiveness of 
existing energy policies and/or climate policies 
related to energy-related GHG emissions in Brazil. 
It also makes recommendations on the implemen-
tation of new policies to spread the use of existing 
and potential low-carbon technologies in Brazil.
Finally, Conclusions and Recommendations 
presents conclusions and summarizes the main 
policy recommendations that concern the key 
energy subsector emitters. Because this report takes 
a qualitative approach to potential and realistic 
policies to be implemented or enhanced, the effects 
of each recommendation have not been quantified 
in the present analysis. 
How the remaining 
carbon budget is 
allocated by country—
and what Brazil’s 
share should be...is 
fundamentally a political 
question, but there are 
various approaches 
and proposals under 
consideration in the 
literature that could 
be used to determine 
Brazil’s economy-wide 
“fair share.”
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BACKGROUND  
AND CONTEXT 
Historically, the vast majority of Brazil’s GHG emissions1 
have stemmed from deforestation and forest degradation. The 
contribution from energy-related GHG emissions was relatively 
modest, because of heavy reliance on renewable energy sources 
(biofuels and hydropower). However, this scenario has changed 
and energy and agriculture represent the key sectors.
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Figure 1  |   Annual Deforestation Rates in the Legal Amazon (1988–2014)
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Since 2005, the Brazilian government has pri-
oritized command-and-control policies to reduce 
deforestation in the Legal Amazon (the socio-geo-
graphic division in Brazil that contains nine states 
in the Amazon Basin), through the Action Plan 
for Prevention and Control of Deforestation in the 
Legal Amazon—PPCDAM (MMA, 2004) and in the 
Cerrado savannah, through the Action Plan for the 
Prevention and Control of Deforestation and Forest 
Fires in the Cerrado—PPCerrado (MMA, 2010). 
In December 2009, the Brazilian Government 
launched the National Policy on Climate Change 
(PNMC) through Federal Law No. 12.187/2009. In line 
with its submission to the UNFCCC, the PNMC pledged 
Brazil to a 36.1–38.9 percent reduction in GHG 
emissions by 2020, relative to a trend-line scenario, 
and established a reduction target for deforestation 
rates of 80 percent in the Legal Amazon and 40 
percent in the Cerrado savannah. A year later, Decree 
7.390 was established to regulate the PNMC, and 
stated that the 2020 commitments should be achieved 
through sectoral mitigation and adaptation plans. The 
Satellite Monitoring System of the Brazilian Amazon 
Forest (PRODES) provides the annual deforesta-
tion rates in the Legal Amazon, and the latest data 
(INPE PRODES, 2014) show that deforestation 
rates reached their lowest level in 2012. There was 
a one-year increase of 28 percent in 2013 over the 
previous year’s rate but a return to the decreasing 
trend (18 percent) in 2014, as shown in Figure 1.
As Brazil’s response to deforestation becomes more 
effective, and as reliance on fossil fuels for energy 
grows, the country’s GHG emissions profile is 
undergoing a radical transformation. 
The Ministry of Science, Technology and Innova-
tion (MCTi) periodically publishes information on 
national GHG emissions divided into main sectors 
grouped according to their processes, sources, and 
sinks, as determined by the 2006 IPCC Guidelines 
for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories (IPCC, 
2006): energy; industrial processes and product use 
(IPPU); waste; and agriculture, forestry, and other 
land use (AFOLU)—which includes agriculture, and 
land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF). 
Each sector comprises individual categories and 
sub-categories, and this report is focused on the 
energy-related GHG emissions from these sectors. 
The latest GHG emissions estimates for the five 
broad sectors (MCTi, 2013) are available up to the 
year 2011 (see Table 1.)
Source: INPE PRODES, 2014.
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Table 1  |  Brazilian GHG Emissions Estimates by Sector, 1990-2011
SECTORS
MTCO2EQ CHANGE (PERCENT)
1990 1995 2000 2005 2011 1995-2005 2005-2011
Energy 188 228 299 328 408 44 24
Industrial Processes 53 63 72 78 86 24 11
Agriculture 304 336 348 416 450 24 8
LULUCF 816 1940 1343 1179 310 -39 -74
Waste 29 33 38 42 48 24 15
TOTAL 1389 2601 2100 2043 1302 -21 -36
Source: MCTi, 2014.
According to more recent estimates from the Brazil-
ian Greenhouse Gas Emissions System (SEEG, 
2014), in 2012, fossil-energy emissions for the first 
time surpassed those from agriculture (Figure 2), 
and they are expected to surpass those from land-
use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) in the 
very near future. 
It is important to highlight the difference in the 
methodological approach to estimating GHG 
emissions used by the Brazilian government and 
that used by independent data collection systems, 
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Figure 2  |   Brazilian GHG Emissions by  
Sector, 2000–2012
Source: SEEG, 2014.
for example, the SEEG. Both of them are based on 
the IPCC guidelines for national inventories, but 
the Brazilian national inventories and periodic 
GHG emissions estimates published by the MCTi 
consider not only GHG emissions but also removals 
due to the increase of carbon stocks (that is, net 
GHG emissions). Methodologically, SEEG estimates 
consider gross GHG emissions (they do not 
account for GHG removals), and they also do not 
consider the offsets from GHG emission-reduction 
certificates originated by Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM) projects in Brazil.
Because of the focus on land use as the key driver of 
climate change in Brazil, as well as the historically 
low-carbon content of key energy sources, there has 
been limited pressure on Brazil to explore energy 
efficiency and renewable energy (beyond hydropower 
and bioenergy) in response to climate change. 
As previously mentioned, renewables accounted for 
39.4 percent of Brazil’s total primary energy supply 
in 2014, while the world average was 13.2 percent 
(EPE, 2015). Although the Brazilian energy mix can 
be considered relatively “clean,” there are many 
opportunities to reduce energy-related GHG emis-
sions (Schaeffer et al, 2012a). Furthermore, even as 
the absolute quantity of renewable energy continues 
to increase, its share of the total energy mix is on 
the decline. That is, non-renewable energy is grow-
ing faster than renewable energy (Figure 3).
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Official outlooks and investment patterns imply 
that the country is heading toward a carbon-
intensive lock-in. Around 80 percent of the energy 
investments in Brazil between 2013 and 2022 
(approximately 0.5 trillion U.S. dollars) will be 
allocated to fossil fuels, as shown in Figure 4.
The lock-in stems also from economic factors. 
Subsidies for fossil fuels and carbon-intensive 
sectors were used to curb inflation and are still 
widespread, resulting in artificially low prices to 
the consumer for diesel oil, gasoline, and electricity 
from natural gas. The 2015 economic crisis has 
forced the government to review these directives, 
but there are still several unclear and uncertain 
rules that reduce the attractiveness of investments 
in renewable energy. Artificial energy prices plus 
the promotion of mass consumption of private cars 
and appliances with obsolete technologies inhibit 
energy-efficiency measures. Until recently, energy 
investments and policies relied on likely revenues 
Figure 3  |   Brazilian Total Primary Energy Supply by Fuel (in thousand tonnes of oil equivalent—ktoe)
Source: Authors’ extrapolation based on data from MME, 2014.
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from the export (and import substitution) of 
conventional fossil fuels—chiefly oil from the Pre-
salt offshore basin. Recently, plunging international 
oil prices have highlighted the vulnerability of the 
economy in Brazil (and many other countries) to 
such unexpected revenue swings. 
Adding to the uncertainties of energy planning and 
of the economy as a whole, the multilateral environ-
mental scene remains somewhat unclear. Under the 
UNFCCC, nations are defining, and in a process of 
announcing, their intended nationally determined 
contributions (INDCs) for the 21st Conference 
of the Parties, to be held in December 2015. The 
so-called “Paris Agreement” is intended to reflect 
ambitious national commitments in terms of GHG 
emissions reductions.
In the case of Brazil, a range of GHG mitigation 
scenarios and forecasts (Annex 1) shows that such 
pledges have to go beyond avoided deforestation 
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Figure 4  |   Allocation of Energy Sector Investments in the Period 2014–2023
Source: Authors’ elaboration from EPE, 2014.
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in the Amazon region (and land use as a whole), 
and include necessarily long-term transformative 
actions in the energy sector. 
Adaptation is another important topic for Brazil, 
helping to preserve the country’s economic 
competitiveness, given its heavy dependence on 
climate-sensitive natural resources. Moreover, 
the country’s infrastructure—power transmission 
lines, roads, and human settlements—is not 
sufficiently resilient to the threats posed by climate 
change. Considering that adaptation costs increase 
with climate change impacts, it should be in the 
interest of Brazil to achieve as soon as possible an 
ambitious global agreement that stabilizes global 
temperatures at safe levels. 
The reasons for action are not only ethical but also 
economic. Factoring in climate change, Brazil-
ian GDP estimates for year 2050 are lowered by 
0.5–2.3 percent, compared to baseline projections. 
In present value, using an annual discount rate of 
one percent, the cost of inaction regarding GHG 
emissions could be between roughly USD 240 
billion and USD 1.2 trillion, which would be equiva-
lent to wasting at least one whole year of growth 
over the coming 40 years (Marcovitch, Dubeux, and 
Margulis, 2011).
To this end, Brazil will need to change course, in 
terms of technology, policies, and international 
diplomacy. The country has achieved a considerable 
level of mitigation over the last decade thanks to the 
control of deforestation. Nevertheless, further prog-
ress is required to reduce emissions in non-LUC 
sectors—in particular energy—which are growing 
rapidly. The use of scenarios (Annex 1) and carbon 
budgets (Annex 2) can help guide this process.
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SCENARIO ANALYSIS
Scenario-building and analysis is an important tool in energy 
planning and policymaking. The results and conclusions drawn 
from scenarios depend upon the assumptions employed for 
their development; the approach can thus help scientists and 
policymakers to forecast the results of a hypothetical situation and 
make policy choices that are more likely to deliver a specific goal. 
A modeling exercise can serve as a robust guide for decision-
makers as they try to understand what would happen if the 
assumptions were to become concrete (Kwon and Østergaard, 
2012; Schaeffer et al., 2012b).
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Integrating and analyzing climate data through 
the use of scenarios can lay out a range of pos-
sible futures facing a country’s energy sector and 
demonstrate the relationships between technolo-
gies, policies, energy supply/demand, and GHG 
emissions. When analyzed alongside a given global 
carbon budget, scenarios can help scientists and 
policymakers to understand which combinations of 
technology and policy choices are consistent with 
such a budget cap, if adopted, and which are not. 
In the case of Brazil, analysis of the GHG emissions 
contributed by each energy subsector in the latest 
Ten-Year Plan 2023 (approved in December 2014), 
for example, enables the evaluation of trends in sec-
toral emissions from 2014 to 2023, and can serve 
as a relevant input to the formulation of mitigation 
policies in Brazil.
The scenarios examined were developed for various 
purposes, and were based on a range of methodologies 
and assumptions. The present study is limited to 
publications that meet the following criteria:
 ▪ Official and independent modeling of supply 
and demand in the energy sector in Brazil that 
presents outlooks for future GHG emissions. ▪ Official and independent modeling that is suf-
ficiently recent (not older than five to six years 
and extending at least through 2020) to reflect 
Brazil’s latest energy-planning developments 
and to ensure that modeling parameters are 
relatively up to date. The exception was the 
National Energy Plan (PNE 2030) that was 
published in 2007, but it was included in the 
analysis because it is the current official plan 
adopted by the federal government. PNE 2030 
will ultimately be replaced by PNE 2050, for 
which Terms of Reference and some economic 
premises were published in 2013 and 2014, but 
PNE 2050 is still under development and can-
not therefore serve as the basis for this analysis.
Annex 1 of this report details GHG mitigation 
scenarios and pathways that have been published 
in recent years. It explores in detail the various 
projections of future energy-related GHG emissions 
in Brazil and compares the assumptions underly-
ing each projection. Annex 1 also identifies the key 
factors that differentiate these scenarios in terms 
of their consistency, or lack of consistency, with a 
given carbon budget. This is explained in more detail 
The National Energy Plan—PNE 2030 (2007) 
shows basically four scenarios, covering a broad range of 
possibilities. Uncertainties are high and the assumptions 
made in 2007 are now being revised for the 2050 outlook, 
still not published.
McKinsey (2009) launched a study utilizing marginal 
abatement cost curves (MACC) to produce low-carbon 
pathways for all domestic sectors in year 2030. The 
publication has a very low level of detail, and data are  
not traceable.
World Bank—De Gouvello et al. (2010) analysis is 
another MACC study, based on the intermediate reference 
scenario from Brazil’s National Energy Plan (PNE) 2030, 
which assumes an average economic growth rate for Brazil. 
Using a higher level of detail, it identifies a Low-Carbon 
Scenario which uses mitigation options such as hybrid cars 
and carbon capture and storage.
The (PNMCs) Brazil 2020 Pledge (2010) considers 
only implemented and adopted policies in Brazil, and 
adopts the annual Ten-Year Energy Plan as the sectoral plan 
for mitigation and adaptation in the energy sector,  
with projected 2020 emissions using a considerably inflated 
trendline as discussed in pages 60 and 61. 
The IEA’s Energy Technology Perspectives—ETP 
(2012) defines three scenarios for the Brazilian Energy 
sector, consistent with the 2°C, 4°C, and 6°C pathways 
respectively by 2100. The study projects that even after 
compliance with the Brazilian Nationally Appropriated 
Mitigation Actions (NAMAs), proposed emission reductions 
would exceed even the 6°C trajectory.
La Rovere et al (2013) shows the energy sector as 
the major source of emissions for Brazil post-2020 and 
presents three projections based on existing policies, more 
ambitious policies, and advanced strategies.
Greenpeace (2013) presents an ambitious low-
carbon highly renewable scenario, with decentralized and 
integrated solutions, plus phase-outs of fossil fuels and 
nuclear power.
The IEA’s World Energy Outlook WEO (2014) includes 
the Current Policies Scenario (formally enacted as of mid-
2014); the New Policies (with the enactment of all improved 
policies under consideration by the government); and the 
450 (ppm) scenario (bolder and consistent with a proposed 
allocation of the global carbon budget from the IPCC AR5).
BOX 1  |  SCENARIO ANALYSIS: POSSIBLE 
FUTURES FOR BRAZIL’S CO2 EMISSIONS 
FROM THE ENERGY SECTOR
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in Annex 2. It is important to note that this report 
compiles several different sources of information, 
from different dates. For this reason, the base years 
and the underlying assumptions adopted in different 
projections will vary.
A brief summary of these scenarios is provided in 
Box 1.
Collectively, the scenarios paint a picture of a range 
of possible futures for Brazil, against which cur-
rent policies and alternative approaches can be 
examined. The scenarios provide alternatives to a 
reference scenario, which assumes the maintenance 
of existing trends (without considering potential 
policy changes). This contrast between the refer-
ence or “business-as-usual” scenario and the alter-
native scenarios is an important tool, not only to 
explain the implications of the long-term strategies 
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to be adopted, but also to evaluate the credibility of 
alternative scenarios (Schaeffer et al., 2012a).
The results of the comparative analysis of published 
GHG emission scenarios for Brazil are presented 
in Figure 5, which shows the historical trendline of 
emissions reported to 2013, and various extrapola-
tions based on the alternative scenario studies. 
In terms of adjusting the estimates and projections, 
the PDE 2023 (reference case scenario) estimates 
and projections for GHG emissions resulting from 
the energy sector in Brazil are as follows: 329 
MtCO2e in 2005, 483 MtCO2e in 2014 (most recent 
historical figure), 537 MtCO2e in 2017; 601 MtCO2e 
in 2020; and 660 MtCO2e in 2023.
Figure 5  |   Brazilian CO2 Emissions from the Energy Sector: Scenario Comparison 
Source: NAMA, PDE 2023, PNE 2030, alternative scenarios.
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POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
FOR KEY ENERGY-
RELATED GHG 
EMISSIONS 
As already mentioned, the Brazilian national GHG emissions are 
estimated by major economic sectors, each grouped according 
to its processes, sources, and sinks, as determined by the 2006 
IPCC Guidelines for National GHG (IPCC, 2006): energy, industrial 
processes, waste, agriculture, and LULUCF. Each sector comprises 
individual categories and sub-categories, and this report is focused 
on the energy-related GHG emissions from these sectors. 
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Energy-related GHG emissions in Brazil can be 
divided into the following categories, from the high-
est to the lowest emitters: (1) transport (2) industry 
(3) power-generation sector (or simply power sec-
tor) (4) fuel production/fuel transformation (also 
known as energy sector) (5) fugitive emissions (6) 
buildings (residential, public, and commercial), and 
(7) agriculture and livestock.
The latest EPE annual report, published at the 
end of 2014 (EPE, 2014), indicates that almost 
half of the energy-related GHG emissions in Brazil 
come from the transportation sector (46 percent), 
followed by industry (22 percent), and the power-
generation sector (13 percent). EPE estimates that 
these shares will remain roughly the same over the 
next decade (Figure 6).
2014
2023
Fuel production/fuel
transformation (energy sector): 29
Transport: 224
Industrial: 106
Power generation: 64
Building sector: 21
Fugitive emissions: 21
Agriculture and livestock: 18
total=
483
MtCO
2
e
total=
660
MtCO
2
e
Fuel production/fuel
transformation (energy sector): 57
Transport: 306
Industrial: 145
Power generation: 73
Building sector: 33
Fugitive emissions: 25
Agriculture and livestock: 22
Figure 7 disaggregates GHG emissions by energy 
end use from 1970 to 2023. These data were calcu-
lated on the basis of different official governmental 
reports (MME, 2014; EPE, 2014; MCTi, 2010) 
by applying emission factors to estimates of fuel 
consumption. The results highlight the relevance of 
particular energy-related GHG emission categories 
to climate policies, especially transport, industry, 
and the power-generation sector.
Lampreia et al.(2011) consider a number of energy-
related technologies and identify levels of feasibil-
ity for their widespread deployment in Brazil by 
2030, as well as key barriers that would need to be 
addressed to foster the use of such technologies. 
The selection of technologies was based on a litera-
Figure 6  |   Energy-related GHG Emissions in 2014 and Projected for 2023 
Source: EPE, 2014.
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Figure 7  |   Brazilian Energy-related GHG Emissions: Historical and Projected GHG Emissions 
Disaggregated by End Use
Source: Authors’ elaboration, from MME 2014, EPE 2014, MCT 2010.
ture review of development scenarios and ongoing 
governmental plans. Table 2 presents a synthesis of 
the study’s results; however, the level of feasibility 
(low, medium, or high) has been updated by the 
authors of this report, based on analysis of recent 
official energy planning documents, scenarios, and 
conversations with experts. Lampreia et al. (2011) 
do not estimate the potential quantified contribu-
tion of each technology, but such estimates can 
be found in the minimum assessment cost studies 
covered in the scenario analysis. 
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Table 2  |   Summary of the Feasibility of Low-Carbon Technological Developments in the  
Energy Sector in Brazil by 2030
LOW-CARBON TECHNOLOGY 
OPTIONS KEY BARRIERS
FEASIBILITY OF 
WIDE DEPLOYMENT 
BY 2030
Small hydropower Initial investments and possible land-use conflicts High
Liquid biofuels Land-use conflicts and logistics High
Solid biomass Droughts, lack of incentives, logistics, costs, and cultural inertia High
Biogas Technological upgrade lag and costs, small scale High
Transport fuel switching Fossil-fuel lobby, lack of adequate technologies High
Wind energy and biopower Connection to the grid, lack of incentives, financing constraints High
End-use fuel efficiency Upfront costs of modern equipment Medium to high
End-use power efficiency Upfront costs of modern equipment Medium to high 
Energy recovery from waste Logistics, education, and permitting regulations for incinerators Medium
Hydro power Costs, water-level variations and permitting conflicts Medium
Transport sector efficiency Technological delay and costs Medium
Solid biomass (iron, steel) Lack of control over deforestation in charcoal production and logistics Medium
End-use fuel switching Fossil-fuel lobby, variation in natural gas supply Medium
Power efficiency Costs and lack of incentives Medium to high
Solar photovoltaics Intermittency and lack of incentives Medium to high
Concentrated Solar Power Costs of technology, energy storage Low
CCS offshore, CO
2
 injection Costs of technology and regulatory issues Low
CCS with bioenergy (BECCS) Costs of technology and regulatory issues Low
CCS other Higher costs, lack of incentives and regulation Low
Hydrogen technologies Costs, lack of incentives, know-how and infrastructure Low
Nuclear energy Social conflicts, potential risks, regulatory delays and high costs Low
Microalgae biofuels Initial costs, need for R&D and cultural inertia, small scale Low
Source: Adapted from Lampreia et al., 2011.
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The following chapter provides a deeper focus 
on the major GHG-emitting energy subsectors in 
Brazil—transport, industry, and power genera-
tion—examines the main trends, and recommends 
policies to meet energy needs in ways that are 
consistent with global climate goals. These recom-
mendations are based largely on (i) policy litera-
ture specific to Brazil; (ii) international literature 
on best-practice policies in key energy sectors; 
(iii) analysis of existing GHG scenarios; and (iv) 
expert opinion elicited from energy and climate 
stakeholders. 
Transport 
Context and trends 
From the GHG-emissions standpoint, transporta-
tion is one of the most urgent Brazilian energy 
subsectors to address, and the various scenarios 
discussed above identified it as the key energy 
subsector to be decarbonized. As already men-
tioned, in 2013, transportation was responsible for 
nearly half of Brazil’s energy emissions (46 percent 
or 224 MtCO2e) (EPE, 2014), and in EPE’s outlook 
this share is projected to be maintained over the 
next decade. By 2023, overall energy emissions 
are expected to increase from 483 MtCO2e to 660 
MtCO2e, of which transportation will account for 
306 MtCO2e (EPE 2014). 
Initiatives to reduce GHG emissions from the Bra-
zilian transportation sector have taken a variety of 
approaches. Under the Sectoral Plan for Transport 
and Urban Mobility for the Mitigation of Climate 
Change (PSTM), a proposal to develop energy-
efficiency standards for the light- and heavy-duty 
vehicle fleets was developed in 2012 (MMA, 2012). 
The so-called Inovar-Auto program was established 
to support technology development, innovation, 
safety, environmental protection, energy efficiency, 
and the quality of vehicles. This program, however, 
lacks ambition to bring Brazilian vehicle standards 
into line with international best practices. More-
over, future steps for this initiative are not clearly 
defined as of July 2015, which creates uncertainty 
for investors and undoubtedly delays manufac-
turers’ investment plans concerning advanced 
technologies. Another challenge is how to induce car-
makers to develop the flex-fuel technology necessary 
to incorporate ethanol fuel efficiently in new hybrid 
electric vehicles. Heavy-duty diesel-fueled engines 
are also not prepared to run on high blends of bio-
diesel covered by the manufacturers’ guarantees.
Contrary to any reasonable climate and energy 
efficiency policy, the government decided, in 2012, 
to discontinue the Tax on Industrialized Goods 
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Figure 8  |  CO2 Emissions from Freight Transportation and Emission Reductions from 2011 to 2031
Source: MMA PSTM, 2013a.
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(IPI) on cars, which resulted in a reduction in the 
price of new vehicles and a consequent increase in 
car sales volumes. This measure contributed not 
only to increasing GHG emissions from vehicles 
but also to worsening traffic conditions and 
urban mobility. The decision was finally reversed 
in January 2015, when the federal government 
restored the IPI on vehicles to discourage the 
increase in private car transportation. Another 
problem was the “artificial” price of gasoline 
established by the government. This price control 
policy was implemented to curb inflation, as part 
of a government attempt to avoid transferring to 
consumers the instability of fuel prices caused by 
the short-term volatility in international oil prices. 
The gasoline subsidies encouraged flex-fuel vehicle 
owners to choose the fossil option over ethanol, and 
consequently reduce market share and incentives for 
flex-fuel hybrids, as further discussed in this section.
Under current policies, Brazil foresees only a 
modest abatement in GHG emissions from the 
transport sector over the coming decades. The 
National Plan of Logistics and Transport (PNLT) 
and the PSTM encompass only the relatively 
conservative assumptions of the Ten-Year Energy 
Plan (PDE 2020). They envision only business-
as-usual (0.6 percent/year) gains in the energy 
efficiency of light- and heavy-duty vehicles. 
Regarding freight, the measures would result in a 
two percent reduction relative to the reference case 
out to 2030 (Figure 8). Clearly, current policies 
need to be revised as a matter of urgency.
 
The PNLT is reflected in the 2013 Climate Sectoral 
Plan for Transport (MMA, 2013a), but this trans-
lates to relatively weak abatements on the order 
of 20 MtCO2e by 2020 and 50 MtCO2e by 2031 in 
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freight transport, and 19.5–20 MtCO2e by 2020 
for all modes of passenger transport. (By contrast, 
1,255 MtCO2e of abatement is foreseen for 2020 in 
the Decree 7.390/2010 described previously.) 
Further abatement potential
There is room for Brazil to go significantly beyond 
these plans (reference scenarios), resulting not only 
in enhanced GHG mitigation, but also—in some 
cases—in improved mobility and reduced air pol-
lution, as shown in abatement scenarios in Figure 9. 
   
The scenarios indicate that, for example, a combi-
nation of reduced energy demand through technol-
ogy improvements and modal shift, along with a 
larger role for biofuels, could result in a GHG abate-
ment of approximately 10 to 30 percent in 2030, 
relative to reference cases (Figure 9).
             
The key opportunities for further emissions-
reduction potential in the transportation sector are 
discussed below. 
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Figure 9  |   GHG Emission Reduction in the 
Transportation Sector in 2030 in 
Reference and Abatement Scenarios
Source: Authors’ assessment based on various GHG emission mitigation scenarios.
There is room 
for Brazil to go 
significantly beyond 
these plans...
resulting not only 
in enhanced GHG 
mitigation, but 
also—in some 
cases—in improved 
mobility and reduced 
air pollution.
Encouraging Modal Shift
Diversifying and integrating modal transportation 
systems: freight transport
One of the main reasons for the inefficiency of 
freight transport in Brazil is the inappropriate 
use of different modes of transportation (Erhart 
and Palm, 2006). The lack of sufficient lines and 
terminals to integrate rail and road transport routes 
results in an overload of road transport. The rela-
tively low price of building the highway system also 
represents an obstacle to the expansion of other 
modes. 
Although more efficient modes (for example, rail 
and waterways) are currently growing more quickly 
than road transport their role remains limited and 
modal shift is not being pursued aggressively by 
the government. Rail and water transportation are 
WRI.org        28
impeded by the complicated bureaucratic proce-
dures involved in obtaining environmental licens-
ing, high costs of constructing infrastructure, and 
lack of governmental attention (MMA, 2013b). 
Freight transportation in Brazil comprises 61.1 
percent road transport and only 20.7 percent rail 
transport in terms of tonne-kms (tonnes of freight 
transported over one kilometer) (ANTT, 2013) 
(Figure 10); in other countries, the shares of road 
and rail modes are generally more evenly divided, 
and rail modes provide additional direct benefits to 
society because they transport passengers as well 
as freight. In Brazil, rail modes are generally not 
focused on passengers and the main beneficiary is 
the mining sector (freight transportation).
Because most freight travels by road, and because 
diesel constitutes the main fuel used for road 
freight transportation, freight transportation 
contributes significantly to GHG emissions. Freight 
transportation in Brazil released approximately 100 
MtCO2e in 2013, which corresponds to almost half 
of all transport-sector emissions (SEEG, 2014).
Historically, Brazilian transportation policies have 
paid relatively little attention to social and envi-
ronmental sustainability issues (Santos and Kahn, 
2013), but systemic changes to shift transport 
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toward less energy- and carbon-intensive modes in 
Brazil have become a crucial issue in the context of 
enhancing the quality of life of citizens, especially in 
big cities. With regard to environmental licenses for 
key rail and waterway projects, the current environ-
mental regulatory framework in Brazil requires a 
range of licenses, resulting in high fees to get a final 
license. Considering the multi-level nature of Bra-
zilian environmental licensing laws, many projects 
face overlapping environmental jurisdictions at the 
federal and state levels. 
The costs increase even more if environmental 
licensing is delayed (Soito and Freitas, 2011). The 
Brazilian Institute of Environment and Renewable 
Natural Resources (IBAMA), as the administrative 
body with responsibility for implementing and 
regulating Brazilian Environment National Policy 
under the Ministry of the Environment (MMA), 
could streamline licensing without compromising 
environmental integrity. This could be achieved 
not by reducing the number of safeguards but by 
providing clearer rules and reducing regulatory 
uncertainties. 
According to Machado (2008), the key challenge 
lies not in dealing with each transportation mode 
individually, but in promoting the integration of 
road, rail, water, pipelines, and air transportation 
Figure 10  |   Brazilian Freight  
Transportation by Mode
Source: CNIT, 2013.
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modes, and creating storage spaces for freight. It 
would be important for the federal government to 
invest in more actions to maximize the use of the 
available capacity of transportation modes, and in 
more efficient modes (ANTT, 2014). 
Encouraging modal shift and promoting multi-
modal transportation systems in Brazil would 
reduce the high reliance on road transport and lead 
to better integrated planning, especially in terms of 
land use in urban centers. In pursuit of these goals, 
freight transport vehicles need to be larger, carry a 
bigger load, and operate more quickly. Ports must 
be prepared for such demands via land and water, 
and this requires significant government effort. 
As for the high costs of infrastructure, financial 
resources have not been sufficient to plan and 
implement a national system of integrated surface 
transport. Governments have been struggling to 
balance investments in transportation with other 
pressing needs (eliminating poverty, improving 
health conditions, and combating hunger, among 
others). However, it is possible to achieve substan-
tial improvements in all modes and in their integra-
tion, even with existing resources. Federal plans, 
especially the National Mobility Plan (Plan-Mob) 
do not currently provide strong support for shifting 
transportation modes (for example, road to rail), 
and a greater integration between transport regula-
tory agencies could help with establishing measures 
to integrate modal transportation systems. 
Diversifying and integrating modal transportation 
systems: passenger transport 
Integrating and optimizing existing routes and 
transport modes for public transport of passengers 
could not only reduce GHG emissions, but also 
increase local quality of life by reducing road traffic 
from individual transportation modes. The benefits 
of investing in mass-passenger transport within 
major urban centers include reduced air pollution 
and improved traffic flow, as well as improved 
management and operation of transportation to 
optimize routes.
The Ministry of Transport could prioritize public 
transportation through exploring high-speed 
rail to displace the use of individual modes of 
transportation for long distances, and also by 
developing high-capacity bus and rail transport 
systems in high-demand areas, as suggested by 
Machado (2008). The Ministry of Cities, under 
the National Secretary of Transport and Urban 
Mobility (SeMob), could offer municipalities 
incentives to create local mass-transport plans 
under the National Mobility Plan (Plan-Mob). As 
measures to discourage individual transportation, 
local governments could create and/or improve 
strategies that limit the use of private cars, such as 
restrictive parking policies in downtown areas or 
license-plate-rationing schemes, similar to those 
used in São Paulo, Quito, and Los Angeles, among 
other cities. Municipalities could also create and/or 
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improve strategies that reduce the emissions impact 
of private vehicles, such as compulsory inspections 
and maintenance programs for heavy vehicles that 
could be linked to annual licensing, and voluntary 
inspection and maintenance programs for light 
vehicles.
Municipal governments of major cities could also 
invest in solutions to manage traffic flow and reduce 
congestion delays, focusing their policies on mass 
passenger transportation systems. Increasing the 
frequency and punctuality of public transportation 
(especially local buses), and increasing the number 
of bus corridors, for example, could save travel 
time, reduce operational costs, improve urban 
mobility, and decrease traffic congestion, all while 
reducing GHG emissions from the transportation 
sector. The most common options in major urban 
centers are Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) systems and 
metro lines. Because BRT systems are less costly 
and can be implemented more quickly (Conselho de 
Arquitetura e Urbanismo, 2015), local governments 
could prioritize the use of BRTs by introducing 
bus-only lanes to improve the speed and comfort 
of travel and reduce traffic congestion. Those cities 
that already have metro and rail systems (such as 
São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro) could improve the 
quality of rail and subway services and expand the 
existing lines.
A survey recently conducted among residents of 
São Paulo City, for example, identified that the 
level of satisfaction with local transportation 
has increased over the past year. One of the 
reasons is the increasing number of bicycle lanes 
(Embarq Brasil, 2015). However, while this is 
an important achievement, the overall shift is 
still very modest and could receive much more 
attention and investment from local governors. 
Local governments could create and expand bike 
lanes, especially in major cities; create more 
bicycle parking facilities; enhance the quality, 
attractiveness, and safety of sidewalks; and 
incorporate bicycle path networks into public-
transport policies and systems. Such measures 
could lead to additional national benefits, such as 
reduced energy costs, fewer road accidents, less 
traffic, better mobility, and less pollution. 
Promoting Vehicle Efficiency
The predominance of road transport is likely to 
persist but the introduction of new vehicle tech-
nologies, particularly those that increase the energy 
efficiency of heavy vehicles, can play an important 
role in mitigating GHG emissions. In fact, there is 
already competition among manufacturers to offer 
more fuel-efficient trucks for freight transporta-
tion because fuel expenses represent a high por-
tion of freight operating costs. Major investments 
in infrastructure to increase storage capacity at 
dispatching and receiving locations and better 
Integrating and optimizing 
existing routes and 
transport modes for public 
transport of passengers 
could not only reduce 
GHG emissions, but also 
increase local quality 
of life by reducing road 
traffic from individual 
transportation modes. The 
benefits of investing in 
mass-passenger transport 
within major urban 
centers include reduced 
air pollution and improved 
traffic flow, as well as 
improved management and 
operation of transportation 
to optimize routes.
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logistics planning—at both the supply chain level 
and on road and rail networks to avoid the need for 
long distance transport—could reduce unnecessary 
tonne-kms and result in efficiency gains of more 
than 75 percent in tons CO2 per kilometer (CEFIC, 
2012; EPE, 2011; SP, 2010; Filho, 2010). 
According to the New European Driving Cycle 
(NEDC) test cycle (adapted from ICCT 2012), 
improved efficiency standards could result in a 
30–50 percent increase in efficiency for a new fleet 
of light-duty vehicles. 
Table 3 shows how national vehicle efficiencies vary 
among different models of the same sized engine. 
Hence, considerable savings—ranging from one 
third to one half of fuel consumption—could 
be achieved by selecting more efficient models. 
However, it should be noted that the entire vehicle 
fleet cannot be replaced at once, and it will take 
time to transition the fleet. A complementary 
measure is the widespread adoption of vehicle 
inspection and maintenance (I/M) schemes, which 
induce better calibration, resulting in more efficient 
fuel burning and thus mitigating GHGs, as well as 
abating black carbon and other pollutants.
The regulation of CO2 emissions through efficiency 
standards is a powerful tool and can lead to effi-
ciency, innovation, and competitiveness in the 
automotive industry, but Brazilian average vehicle 
efficiency targets fall short of those established 
in the world’s largest economies. The Vehicle Air 
Pollution Control Program (PROCONVE IBAMA), 
responsible for such regulations, could improve this 
situation by mandating limits on CO2 emissions in 
exhaust pipes of all vehicle models with all fuels 
(even the vehicles that are fueled with renewable 
energy sources). Ambitious technological efficiency 
standards that result in lower CO2 emissions per 
distance travelled would lead not only to more 
efficiency, but also to less pollution from carbon 
monoxide (CO), nitrogen oxides (NOx), particulate 
materials etc. 
Cars in Brazil could be set emission targets on the 
order of 100–120 gCO2/km by 2020, compared to 
around 180 in 2014 and to the target of 137 gCO2/
km proposed for 2017.2 Car manufacturers utilize 
international efficiency standards. Even in the 
United States, manufacturers voluntarily exceeded 
the standard, reaching 178 gCO2 in 2012. The 2016 
target is 155 gCO2/km (ICCT, 2012). A carbon tax 
is another option that could lead consumers to buy 
more efficient vehicles, but the federal government 
still gives low priority to this subject, as further 
discussed in Policy Implications.
There are no historic values for vehicle efficiency 
targets in Brazil because CO2 standards were first 
implemented only in 2012 with the Inovar-Auto 
Program (applicable in the period 2013–2017). 
There is no previous database and, as mentioned, 
nothing yet foreseen as a next phase.
Table 3  |   Range of Vehicle Efficiencies and Emissions in Brazil  
(lower and upper limits, 329 new models in urban cycle with gasohol (E22), 2010)
ENGINE (VOLUME) MJ/KM GCO2/KM PROPOSED EMISSION TARGETS BY 2020 GCO2/KM
1.0 1.7–2.6 120–190 100-120
1.3–1.5 1.8–2.8 140–210 100-120
1.6–1.8 2.1–3.2 150–230 100-120
2.0–3.85 2.2–4.0 160–310 100-120
Source: Adapted from Nigro 2012.
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Investing in Electrical and Hybrid Vehicles and 
Increasing Synergies between Transport and the 
Power Sector
Fostering the development of new end-use 
technologies such as electric vehicles and hybrid 
vehicles (electricity and ethanol, for example), as 
well as the production of more efficient vehicles 
that demand less fuel and consequently reduce 
GHG emissions, represents one of the key strategies 
to decarbonize the transportation sector in Brazil 
(Greenpeace, 2013). The diffusion of hybrid and 
electric vehicles provides practical energy efficiency 
over time, and the notion of a hybrid system 
becomes even more tangible in Brazil because 
consumers are already used to a flex-fuel system, 
and it might facilitate an eventual transition to 
electric light vehicles and even to hybrid-drive 
buses (Johnson and Semida, 2014). In the case of 
public transportation, Almeida, Kahn and Cristiane 
(2013) state that the use of hybrid-drive buses is 
a promising option, and that state governments 
should consider the use of hybrid vehicles (diesel-
electric or ethanol-electric) and fuel-cell electric 
vehicles (hydrogen-powered). 
However, the penetration of hybrid and electric 
vehicles in the national market in Brazil is still 
slow, as stated in the terms of reference of the 
2050 PNE (EPE, 2013). Questions of technical and 
economic feasibility, and the lack of governmental 
incentives, have limited their growth to less than 
600 units, and it is estimated that by 2023 they will 
represent only 4.2 percent of new licensed vehicles 
(EPE, 2013). In spite of the various challenges and 
the relatively low support from the government, a 
few initiatives exist to foster their dissemination. 
In 2012, for example, the local government from 
Curitiba established the “Hibribus,” an electric-
biodiesel-fueled public bus that operates with two 
motors (in parallel or independently), leading to a 
reduction in GHG emissions of 35 percent (URBS, 
2012). The electric motor is also used as a power 
generator during braking. Each time the brakes 
are applied, the energy of deceleration is used to 
charge the batteries. In 2013, Renault and Itaipu 
Binational signed an agreement (EPE, 2013) to 
jointly invest in research and development of 
electric vehicles. The agreement includes studies 
to analyze the feasibility of producing some key 
components nationally (instead of importing them). 
An example of such a component is batteries, which 
can account for approximately 50 percent of the 
total costs to produce hybrid vehicles (Sector Value, 
2013). 
Brazil could become a prime candidate for mass 
electrification of part of its transport fleet, if the 
country’s vast untapped renewable energy potential 
is explored. However, it is important to recall 
that electricity is increasingly being generated by 
fossil fuels. If this trend continues, it is possible 
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that incentives to encourage the growth of electric 
vehicles could actually stimulate the demand for 
fossil fuels in power generation. Any decision 
to promote electric vehicles should emphasize 
co-benefits, such as lowered local air pollution. It is 
also important to consider the increasing role that 
biofuels can play in the transport sector, ultimately 
leading to lower carbon emissions than under an 
“electrified” scenario.
By increasing the share of renewable energy in 
the electricity mix, a major shift toward electricity 
consumption in the transport sector in Brazil could 
be very important to help the load curve (which 
is the variation in energy demand from a specific 
source at a specific time). The big payoff will result 
from shifting to renewable electricity, rather than 
gasoline and ethanol, to power transport fleets, 
and such a shift could also reduce the pressure on 
distillation capacity for liquid fuels and on land use 
for ethanol production.  
Nevertheless, disseminating the technologies and 
realizing the cost savings from increasing the use of 
hybrid and electric light and heavy vehicles will be 
achieved only in the long term, according to projec-
tions. The same is true for deploying the necessary 
infrastructure that will allow these vehicles to be 
competitive in the market (EPE, 2013). It is esti-
mated that the fleet of regular buses, especially 
urban buses, will migrate to hybrid or electric 
fleets only by 2050, but these estimates are based 
on current (low) incentives to spread the use of 
such technology. If better incentives are provided, 
this migration could occur by 2030. Considering 
that development of the power infrastructure for 
transport and all the distributed energy options can 
bring additional benefits, especially for the domes-
tic industrial capacity of the country, the federal 
government could provide incentives to encourage 
the inclusion of hybrids and electrical vehicles in 
the energy transportation mix in the next 15 years. 
Such incentive should also cover electric motor-
cycles, scooters, and even bicycles, which are in 
the end dematerialized vehicles (vehicles whose 
construction requires less material and energy than 
regular vehicles). 
Because current Brazilian law offers few 
opportunities to introduce these kinds of incentive, 
the federal government could provide tax relief 
(reductions in IPI, PIS, and COFINS) to increase 
production of hybrid and electric vehicles, while 
local governments could provide tax relief (IPVA 
exemption) to increase the sales of such vehicles. In 
some states, for example, Maranhão, Pernambuco, 
Ceará, Rio Grande do Norte, Rio Grande do Sul, 
and Sergipe, there is already a tax exemption 
(IPVA) for hybrid vehicles. In São Paulo, the 
license-plate-rationing scheme does not apply to 
electric vehicles (Stocco, 2013).
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Another option could be that federal and local 
authorities prioritize, at least in the short and 
medium term, the development and operation of 
hybrid public buses (ethanol-electric, biodiesel-
electric, or diesel-electric) in place of hybrid light 
vehicles. Because this technology is considered 
more appropriate to congested, large traffic urban 
zones, it would be easier to create fixed infrastruc-
ture to recharge such vehicles (Almeida, Kahn, and 
Cristiane, 2013). If the government establishes a 
sectoral ethanol fund, as further discussed below, 
part of the resources could be focused on research 
and development to foster the deployment of hybrid 
vehicles that are capable of making efficient use of 
biofuels—a genuine Brazilian technology. 
However, while these alternative options to replace 
fossil fuels in public transportation are relevant 
in terms of GHG emissions, it is important to 
consider the negative effects in terms of the higher 
infrastructural costs of the system; increased 
fees and fares would make public transportation 
less accessible to the population. Because public 
transport in Brazil is currently priced with a tariff, 
it is recommended that the relevant authorities 
subsidize such measures to avoid increasing the 
cost of tariffs because of the burden it places on 
citizens. It is also recommended that subsidies to 
diesel are ended,3 to level the playing field with 
biofuels.
Promoting the Use of Biofuels in the  
Transportation Sector
The production of sugarcane ethanol in Brazil 
is considered highly efficient in capturing and 
converting solar energy relative to other types of 
ethanol. The net energy balance (the output ratio 
of energy contained in a certain volume of the fuel 
divided by the input ratio of energy required for its 
production) of sugarcane first-generation ethanol 
is high (8 to 10), while the net energy balance in the 
production of maize ethanol in the United States, 
for example, is about 1.3 to 1.6 (Shapouri, 2002; 
Macedo, 2004; Goldemberg, 2008). The efficiency 
of sugarcane ethanol can be even higher with 
recent developments on cellulosic ethanol (second 
generation made by grasses, wood etc.) that might 
improve the output/input ratio yields. 
The energy balance associated with sugarcane 
ethanol results in considerably reduced GHG 
emissions: while maize ethanol reduces GHG 
emissions by only 18 percent relative to gasoline, 
sugarcane ethanol in Brazil reduces GHG emissions 
by 91 percent when it replaces gasoline (Macedo, 
2008; Goldemberg, 2008). The World Bank 
estimates that the use of ethanol rather than fossil 
fuels in Brazil results in avoided emissions of 
approximately 50MtCO2e per year (World Bank, 
2010).
Despite these mitigation benefits, there is an 
important debate concerning the land-use change 
(LUC) associated with the production of biofuels, 
and the relationships between food, energy, and 
environmental sustainability (Souza et al., 2015). 
There is considerable controversy surrounding 
the amount of land-use change globally that can 
be linked to the production of biofuel (Tyner and 
Taheripour, 2013; Searchinger and Heimlich, 
2015). In the case of Brazil, robust literature 
reviews show that the expansion of sugarcane in 
recent years has occurred mostly at the expense 
of extensive pasturelands and other temporary 
crops, without leading to perceivable indirect 
land-use change related to deforestation (Walter 
et al. 2011; Souza et al, 2015). There is virtually no 
sugarcane in the Amazon; sugarcane expansion 
occurred outside the Amazonian forest because 
of the practical difficulties of growing sugarcane 
crops in hot and humid areas. The expansion in 
the Cerrado has occurred mainly on pastures, 
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many of them degraded (Pacca and Moreira, 
2009). Furthermore, life cycle analyses (LCA) of 
the main biofuels feedstocks in Brazil show that, 
while they considerably reduce GHG emissions, 
their production in the country does not pose risks 
of invasiveness (Horta Nogueira and Capaz, 2013), 
and that ecosystem services can be adequately 
maintained with appropriate agricultural practices. 
Nevertheless, one of the main environmental 
challenges facing future biofuel production will be 
to ensure that it does not cause harmful land-use 
changes, and it will be imperative to address and 
reconcile concerns about the role of biofuels and 
food security. If there is to be no increase in the 
demand for pastureland for biofuel production, 
this implies that yields for biofuel crops will have 
to increase at the same rate as the increase in 
biofuel demand. If, on the other hand, demand 
for pasture land for food production increases, 
because of rising demand for Brazilian meat and 
dairy products that is not met by productivity 
improvements, the pressure to increase biofuel 
yields will be greater still: biofuel yields will have 
to increase at a faster rate, to compensate for the 
reduced area of pastureland land available for 
biofuel production.
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Figure 11  |   Final Energy Consumption by Fuel Source 
Source: BEN, 2014.
Despite the significant role of sugarcane ethanol 
in the transport sector, the relatively low price of 
gasoline (as a result of subsidies) has reduced the 
share of the biofuel in consumption. In 2009, etha-
nol represented about one third of the fuels market 
for light-duty vehicles in terms of energy content, 
but between 2009 and 2012, the share of ethanol in 
the fuel market for light-duty vehicles in terms of 
energy consumption of road passenger transport, 
for example, decreased from 33.4 percent to 22.3 
percent, while demand for gasoline increased (BEN, 
2014), Figure 11.
In general, biofuels (especially ethanol) lost 
competitiveness in recent years because of several 
factors, including: (i) the use of gasoline subsidies 
designed by the federal government in an attempt 
to curb inflation; (ii) reduction of investments in the 
bioenergy sector following the 2008 financial crisis; 
(iii) loss of agricultural productivity due to climate 
impacts that reduced the yields of sugarcane in 
recent years; and (iv) higher international sugar 
prices, which diverted sugarcane to uses other than 
ethanol production. In order to increase the share 
of biofuel in the energy mix, some existing and 
potential policies are discussed below.
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Phasing out fossil-fuel subsidies
Price controls on fossil fuels subsidize their con-
sumption and affect the competitiveness of renew-
able energy. In Brazil, this is a case of gasoline 
against ethanol (and, to a lesser extent, of diesel 
against biodiesel). Investments prioritizing oil (and 
gas) infrastructure are other forms of “hidden” 
subsidies. Price-control policy is part of the govern-
ment’s efforts to curb inflation, an attempt to avoid 
transferring to consumers the short-term volatility 
in international oil prices (Aidar and Serigati, 2015; 
Fattouh et al., 2015). This leads to relatively lower 
gasoline prices, compared to the “rule of thumb” 
break-even price. It is known from consumer 
behavior studies that ethanol is only preferable if 
the cost per liter is 70 percent of the cost of gasoline 
at the pump, or lower. As a result, flex-fuel vehicle 
owners choose the fossil option over ethanol, and 
consequently reduce market share and incentives 
for flex-fuel hybrids. 
The federal government finally adjusted and raised 
the price of gasoline in 2013; the increase had 
originally been planned for 2007. The government 
also announced an increase in the mandated level 
of ethanol (anhydrous alcohol mixture) from 20 
percent to 25 percent, and unveiled a set of tax cuts 
for the ethanol industry. 
Instead of providing fossil-fuel subsidies, it 
would be more useful to increase the subsidies to 
renewable-energy sources (Goldemberg, 2012). 
In this spirit, when the government recently 
fully reestablished the CIDE for gasoline, it 
created incentives to enhance the production of 
biodiesel, by reducing some federal taxes on the 
production of renewable fuel. They include the 
CIDE tax, the Industrialized Products Tax (IPI), 
the Contribution to the Social Integration Program 
and Civil Service Asset Formation Program (PIS/
Pasep), and the Contribution to Social Security 
Financing (COFINS). The government also offered 
low-cost credit to biofuel producers, as well as some 
subsidies that cover the higher cost of biofuels 
relative to diesel. In November 2014, the federal 
government established the Normative Instruction 
no 1.514, suspending the levy of PIS/Pasep and 
COFINS on the acquisition of raw materials that 
are used for biodiesel production, which translates 
to a tax reduction of 0.825 percent and 3.8 percent 
respectively. 
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Investing in more R&D and creating a sectoral 
biofuel fund
Additional measures are necessary to induce 
continued long-term technological progress on 
biofuels. It is important to coordinate financing 
lines and programs in science, technology, and 
innovation (ST&I) and continuous research and 
development (R&D) to keep the national market 
abreast of new trends in the energy sector. Second-
generation ethanol production, for example, 
allows the use of new biomass, including forest 
and agricultural residues (sugarcane bagasse), 
and is an innovation in the sector that could 
help Brazil maintain its place at the forefront of 
biofuel production (Nova Cana, 2013). The federal, 
state, and local governments could create more 
financial incentives to stimulate the production 
of new domestic technologies on biofuels that 
could increase the number of patents in Brazil and 
decrease production costs. The government could 
establish a sectoral biofuel fund to invest in R&D in 
specific programs to increase efficiency in motors 
fueled by ethanol (first and second generation) and 
biodiesel, and in programs to foster the deployment 
of hybrid vehicles, as discussed further below.
Increasing the mandatory blend of biofuel and 
encouraging 100-percent-biofueled public buses 
While taking care that future biofuel production 
does not cause negative land-use changes, the 
Ministry of Transport (MT) could increase the 
level of the mandatory blend of biodiesel to diesel 
for heavy vehicles and the mandatory blend of 
anhydrous ethanol to gasoline for light vehicles. 
Local governments could also encourage urban bus 
operators to use more biofuel blends. Some cities in 
Brazil, for example, are already starting to operate 
with low-carbon-emission public buses. In 2012, 
Rio de Janeiro City launched the “Sugarcane Diesel 
Project” to test the addition of 30 percent sugarcane 
in the blend of diesel (AFCP, 2012). São Paulo City 
has also invested in a pilot project called “Ecofrota,” 
to test “B20” public buses (buses fueled by a 20 
percent biofuel mix) (AFCP, 2012; SPtrans, 2012).
Besides requesting higher levels of ethanol and 
biodiesel in the fuel market in Brazil, local gov-
ernments could incentivize 100-percent-biofuel 
(ethanol or biodiesel) public buses. In 2007, São 
Paulo City began testing public buses powered by 
100-percent ethanol, as part of an international 
initiative of the Bio Ethanol for Sustainable Trans-
port (BEST) project, led by the Brazilian National 
Reference Center of Biomass (CENBIO) (São Paulo, 
2007). In 2009, the local government from Curitiba 
established, through a private-public partnership 
(PPP), the “B100 Biodiesel Project” to test public 
buses operated with “B-100” fuel (100-percent-soy 
biodiesel), which can lead to 30 percent reductions 
in GHG emissions. This kind of bus involves higher 
costs (an increase of 20 to 30 percent) compared to 
regular fossil-fueled buses, and has been subsidized 
by the local government, but the environmental 
benefits include not only GHG emission reduc-
tions, but also improved air quality in terms of 
lower emissions of particulates and sulfur (URBS, 
2009; BiodieselBr, 2010). Soybean production is 
more extensive than sugarcane in terms of land and 
requires adequate management and prioritization 
in the uses of biodiesel—the case of urban buses, 
which have lower fleets (relative to trucks) and run 
in populated areas. However, the number of such 
buses in operation is still very modest (SPtrans, 
2012), and the need for more incentives is crucial.
Establishing sustainable public procurement that 
prioritizes biofuels
Public procurement accounts for a large share of a 
national economy (estimates range between eight 
percent and 25 percent of GDP) (IPEA, 2010). 
Instead of providing 
fossil-fuel subsidies, it 
would be more useful to 
increase the subsidies to 
renewable-energy sources 
(Goldemberg, 2012). 
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Governments are large-scale consumers and can 
drive innovation by increasing the demand for more 
sustainable production and consumption. There-
fore, sustainable public procurement constitutes a 
relevant tool with great potential to promote envi-
ronmental and social policies. In 2010, Federal Law 
no. 12.349 altered Federal Law no. 8666 of 1993 to 
establish sustainable development as a principle 
of public procurement. It also provides guidelines 
for purchasing green products, including fuels and 
vehicles. At the ministerial level, there is already 
some experience with procurement of goods and 
services that follow sustainability criteria, such as 
the leasing of biofuel vehicles in the Ministry of the 
Environment (MMA, 2015). The Integrated Sys-
tem for General Services Administration (SIASG), 
managed by the Ministry of Planning and Budget 
(MPOG), also included one category for “biofuel 
vehicles” in its registration system (Portal Brazil, 
2012). However, the number of sustainable tenders 
involving biofuel remains very low in Brazil. Public 
procurement constitutes 10 percent of Brazil’s 
GDP and, with due regard for environmentally 
responsible land use, the federal government could 
exert real influence by developing guidelines and 
establishing requirements for public procurement 
that prioritize biofuels in place of fossil fuels in the 
transportation sector.
Establishing a Price on Carbon
A carbon price signal could induce GHG reductions 
across various sectors of the economy. In the case 
of energy-related GHG emissions, carbon pricing 
could comprise a tax rate on GHG emissions or on 
the carbon content of fossil fuels. Such an instru-
ment might be an important tool to tackle climate 
change as part of a package of effective and cost-
efficient policies. 
Several countries have already established carbon 
pricing, including the world’s two largest GHG 
emitters (China and the United States), as shown 
in Figure 12. About 40 national and over 20 sub-
national jurisdictions have implemented or are 
considering (with different degrees of priority) an 
emissions trading system (ETS); together, they 
cover almost six GtCO2e or about 12 percent of 
annual global GHG emissions (World Bank, 2014a). 
Prices vary significantly among carbon-pricing 
schemes (ranging from USD 1/tCO2e in Mexico to 
USD 168/tCO2 in Sweden). For business leaders, 
the discrepancies between the prices can affect 
competitiveness, which indicates the relevance 
of the creation of a global carbon-pricing system 
(Ethos, 2015). However, a low price on carbon will 
not necessarily result in net GHG reductions from 
business as usual (BAU) projections.
In Brazil, the Ministry of Finance could establish 
a carbon-pricing system, based on metrics such 
as CO2 per ton of oil equivalent or per kilometer 
(distance traveled), but the issue of establishing a 
CO2 tax in Brazil is still the subject of controversial 
debate at present. The Ministry of Finance is 
conducting a study to explore the impact of a CO2 
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ETS implemented or scheduled for implementation
ETS implemented or scheduled for implementation in some states/regions
Carbon tax implemented or scheduled for implementation
ETS or carbon tax under consideration
Carbon tax implemented or scheduled, ETS under consideration
ETS and carbon tax implemented or scheduled
tax on the national economy, and the subject has 
also been discussed inside the National Congress 
through the Mixed Commission for Climate 
Change (Câmara dos Deputados, 2014). A national 
pricing mechanism would open an opportunity to 
transform lower carbon emissions from energy into 
competitive advantage, and a tax could encourage 
emissions reductions (Agência Gestão CT&I, 2015). 
However, the federal government is more focused 
on economic incentives to encourage GHG emission 
reductions than on carbon taxes. Given the high tax 
burden in Brazil, the challenges to establishing new 
taxes are very significant.
The introduction of a carbon price need not 
increase tax revenue. There are a number of options 
regarding how a carbon tax could be implemented 
without harm to the country’s economy. One 
option would be to adhere to “revenue neutrality,” 
which involves using the increased tax revenue to 
offset the recessionary effect of carbon taxation. 
Finland and the United Kingdom are examples of 
countries that have adopted tax neutrality as part 
Figure 12  |   Existing, Emerging, and Potential Carbon Pricing Instruments
Source: World Bank, 2014a
of their carbon tax strategy, and their approach 
has generated some political support (Câmara 
dos Deputados, 2014). Another option to reduce 
political resistance and economic impacts would 
involve a gradual implementation of the carbon 
tax. It would be important to use the tax to induce 
behavior change by establishing different levels for 
different economic sectors.
Industry 
Context and trends
The Brazilian industry sector is very diverse, in 
terms of both subsectors and fuels. GHG emissions 
from industrial energy use, however, have been 
dominated by iron and steel production, followed 
by cement. Between 1990 and 2013, GHG emissions 
from the iron and steel subsector increased by 61 
percent, and at present they account for 46 percent 
of emissions from industrial processes. Cement 
production, the second-largest emitter in the 
subsector, accounted for approximately 30 percent 
of industrial GHG emissions in 2013 (SEEG, 2014).
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Although Brazil’s iron and steel industry is 
already very efficient, the subsector is expected to 
be responsible for the greatest share of GHG emis-
sions in the industry sector until 2022, and growth 
in this subsector is expected to lead to considerable 
increases in the consumption of coal, coal coke, and 
coke oven gas, with implications for future emis-
sions. The majority of Brazilian iron and steel (76 
percent in 2012) is produced in blast furnaces/basic 
oxygen furnaces (IAB, 2013; CNI, 2012). National 
average energy intensities in 2007-2011 ranged 
between 20.1 and 20.8 GJ/t steel, while actual best 
technologies reached 14.8 GJ/t steel, with further 
potential energy savings of 4.7 GJ/t steel (WSA, 
2012; IAB, 2013; Henriques Jr, 2010; Worrel et al., 
2008; IEA, 2010). 
Cement: Brazilian cement production relies on the 
relatively efficient dry processing approach. Average 
energy intensity of production in 2007 was 3.7 GJ/t 
clinker, which was slightly better than the global 
average (4.1 GJ/t clinker), but worse than the best 
available technology (2.85 GJ/t clinker) (Henriques 
Jr. 2010; IEA 2007). The profile of fuel consump-
tion in the cement industry has changed dramati-
cally from fuel oil to coal and petroleum coke, which 
has led to more efficiency in the industry.
Non-ferrous metals: Non-ferrous metals 
(ferroalloys) include aluminum, zinc, copper, 
and other metals. This subsector draws primarily 
on charcoal, firewood, and electricity to meet its 
growing energy needs. Aluminum is the most 
electricity-intensive output from this subsector; 
its electricity intensity can be reduced by up to 
95 percent through waste-heat recycling in Brazil 
(OECO, 2013).
Chemicals: The chemical industry involves a vast 
array of products and manufacturing processes, 
from the production of simple substances to the 
complex petrochemical and fine chemical indus-
tries. Its energy mix is also diverse and changing. 
The most energy-intensive products are ethylene 
(or ethene), ammonia, methanol, chlorine, sodium 
hydroxide (or caustic soda), and sulfuric acid. 
Energy-intensive subsectors are petrochemical, 
fertilizer, and chlorine-alkali production, which 
together are responsible for 70 percent of total 
energy consumption in the chemicals industry. 
Some groups (elastomers, resins, plastics, and fine 
chemicals) make specific products involving higher 
energy intensity, but these are less relevant given 
their small share of total energy consumption. 
The various scenarios for the Brazilian energy 
sector presented in Scenario Analysis show that 
industry is the second largest emitter in the energy 
sector and therefore must be the second top prior-
ity in terms of reducing GHG emissions. One of the 
main proposals of the McKinsey (2009) scenario 
for decarbonizing the energy sector in Brazil is to 
improve industrial efficiency. The reference sce-
nario (PNE, 2030) emphasizes the need to phase 
out the use of fossil fuels in industry by 2030. La 
Rovere et al. (2013) show that more efficient and 
cleaner technologies will result in lower emissions 
from industrial processes. A reduction in SF6 emis-
sions and cooling gases as a result of mitigation 
actions in industrial processes was also assumed 
as a consequence of redesigned equipment and 
more advanced techniques in gas collection during 
maintenance activities. 
GHG emissions 
from industrial 
energy use...have 
been dominated 
by iron and steel 
production, 
followed by cement.
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Greenpeace (2013) states that final industrial 
energy consumption can be reduced by 22 percent, 
through the use of solar, biomass, biogas, and 
bioelectricity, contributing to an overall reduction 
in final energy demand,4 achieved by more rational 
use in the buildings, industry, and transport 
sectors. While the Ten-Year Energy Plan does 
not break down future projected energy use by 
subsector, it is possible to estimate this information 
based on certain subsectoral characteristics (like 
dedicated use of certain fuels) and a few simplified 
assumptions (like constant shares of each subsector 
over time).5 Industry in Brazil encompasses a 
wide variety of subsectors fueled by diverse energy 
sources, as shown in Figure 13. Together, they 
contribute approximately one quarter of Brazil’s 
Gross Domestic Product (World Bank, 2014b). 
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Figure 13  |   Evolution of the Brazilian Industry Sector: Subsectors by  
Fuel Source (process emissions not included) 
Source: Authors’ elaboration, from MME 2013, EPE 2014, MCT 2010.
GHG emissions from industry, however, as already 
mentioned, are concentrated in the iron and steel, 
cement, and chemicals subsectors (Figure 14).
 
Current policies
In 2013, the Ministry of Development, Industry, 
and Foreign Commerce (MDIC) published a 
Sectoral Plan on Climate Change Mitigation 
and Adaptation for the Consolidation of a  
Low-Carbon Economy in the Manufacturing 
Industry-Industry Plan, (MDIC, 2013) as mandated 
under Decree 7.390 (Brazil, 2010), regulating the 
Climate Law. The plan covers aluminum, cement, 
pulp and paper, and chemicals during its first 
phase, after which iron and steel, lime, and glass 
are expected to be considered (a separate plan for 
the steel sector is under development). 
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Figure 14  |   Energy-Related GHG Emissions from the Industry Sector,  
1970–2022 (process emissions not included)   
Source: Authors’ elaboration, from MME 2013, EPE 2014, MCT 2010.
According to the Industry Plan, the aim is to achieve 
a five percent reduction below the emissions level 
projected for 2020, and its main goal is to reduce 
all industry-related GHG emissions and prepare the 
sector for the challenges and opportunities of a low-
carbon economy. More specifically, the Industry 
Plan is built on three pillars: 
the gradual implementation of a measurement, 
reporting, and verification (MRV) system;
the creation of an action plan with a set of measures 
and tools to encourage energy efficiency and the 
reduction of GHG emissions in the industry; and
the creation of a Technical Commission on the 
Industry Plan (CTPIn), responsible for detailing, 
monitoring, and reviewing the plan’s activities.
The CTPIn was established by Ministerial Decree 
No 207 and has taken the lead in promoting the 
interaction between public and private entities to 
implement, monitor, and review the Industry Plan. 
The Climate Fund already provides specific funds 
to finance business projects related to the goals of 
the Industry Plan; however, the Commission has 
been struggling to establish a robust MRV system of 
industrial-process emissions and energy use in the 
sectors included in the Industry Plan. Additionally, 
industries have indicated that the Industry Plan is 
not adequately integrated with other sectoral plans 
and a better coordination among them is essential 
to their success. 
Further abatement potential
Although the EPE estimates that industry will 
account for an important share of the economy in 
2050, the 2050 National Energy Planning estimates 
that industry will contribute a decreasing share 
of total Brazilian GDP (EPE, 2014). This trend, in 
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turn, might reduce the relative share of industry’s 
energy consumption over the long term, and 
consequently its relative contribution to total GHG 
emissions.
The scenarios analyzed in Annex 1 suggest that a 
gradual increase in the energy efficiency of materi-
als used in infrastructure, especially in the con-
struction of industrial facilities, is a key opportunity 
for further emissions reduction. The expansion of 
more efficient power plants and the decommis-
sioning of inefficient plants could also reduce the 
projected acceleration of energy demand out to 
2050. The PNE 2050 estimates that overall energy 
efficiency across all industry sectors can contribute 
to reducing energy consumption by approximately 
20 percent by 2050 (EPE, 2014). The various 
scenarios analyzed in Annex 1 also indicate that a 
combination of energy efficiency and the use of low-
carbon technologies (such as solar, wind, carbon 
capture and storage etc.) can result in GHG abate-
ment of approximately 20–43 percent in 2030, 
relative to reference cases.
Increasing incentives for low-carbon fuels, which 
effectively can cause a drop in GHG emissions, is 
one option but these fuels often require adequate 
technologies, supply logistics, and dependability. 
The policies listed below could advance abatement 
in the industry sector.
Establishing a Mandatory and Bottom-Up  
MRV System in Brazil
The Technical Commission on the Industry Plan 
(CTPIn) has established a Working Group on 
Inventories (WG inventories) to set parameters for 
reporting GHG emissions from industrial sectors. 
The Ministry of the Environment, under the Federal 
Joint Center for the Climate, also created, in 2013, 
a Working Group on GHG Registry (Registry WG) 
that aims to propose recommendations for an MRV 
System and a mandatory bottom-up GHG Registry. 
The Registry WG convenes stakeholders from the 
various levels of government, academia, and civil 
society, and intends to assist Brazilian states and 
the federal government to create and/or harmonize 
GHG Registries and to set them on an implementa-
tion path based on robust and effective interna-
tional best practices. However, the Inter-Ministerial 
Commission on Climate Change (CIM) has not yet 
analyzed the recommendations provided, in 2013, 
by the Working Group on GHG Registry for the 
creation of a MRV System in Brazil; it could there-
fore review and approve the document as a first step 
toward establishing such a system in Brazil.
Implementing the Brazilian Market for Emissions 
Reduction (MBRE)
One of the aims of the 2009 National Policy on 
Climate Change (PNMC) is to encourage the 
development of the Brazilian Market for Emissions 
Reduction (MBRE). According to the PNMC, the 
MBRE will be operationalized in stock exchanges 
authorized by the Brazilian Securities and Exchange 
Commission (CVM) to trade GHG emission-
reduction certificates. This market could serve as an 
important tool to reduce GHG emissions in Brazil. 
In 2011, the Working Group on Carbon Markets, 
coordinated by the Ministry of Finance (MF) and 
comprising representatives from various min-
istries, was established by the Inter-Ministerial 
Commission on Climate Change (CIM). Its goal 
was to analyze the feasibility and requirements 
for the implementation of the MBRE and support 
Increasing incentives 
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the CIMGC on decision-making to implement 
the MBRE (MMA, 2011). The working group also 
studied the trade-offs between alternative market 
instruments, such as the creation of a carbon tax in 
Brazil, and prepared a feasibility assessment report 
for the implementation and operation of the MBRE, 
as well as an assessment of the potential and 
cost-effectiveness of market-based instruments for 
reducing emissions in Brazil. However, the MBRE 
has not yet been developed, because the federal 
government has not yet officially approved the final 
report on the establishment of the MBRE. The CIM 
could review and approve the report to help foster 
the creation and implementation of such market.
Labeling the Energy and/or GHG Intensity  
of Products and Processes 
The Ministry of Development, Industry, and Foreign 
Trade (MDIC) could improve sectoral policies for 
industry through the requirement for life cycle 
analysis (LCA) of major industrial products, in order 
to identify the best intervention points to reduce GHG 
emissions. Life cycle analysis could provide additional 
reduction options ranging from the selection of new 
materials to the choice of logistics that benefit the 
overall reduction of GHG emissions. The MDIC could 
create methods and metrics to distinguish among 
industrialized products according to their GHG 
intensity. This measure would differentiate similar 
and substitute products available in the market 
according to the GHG emissions that resulted from 
their production processes. This labeling measure 
could encourage competition among industries for the 
production of less carbon-intensive products. 
Implementing a consumption regime based on 
energy intensity standards is a more difficult task, 
because trade barrier claims can be raised; such 
a step would require concerted and intense legal 
efforts. Globally, these measures have, for the most 
part, been implemented as part of voluntary private 
certification schemes, and governmental support is 
still very limited (International Trade Center, 2012). 
Energy intensity standards are a very controversial 
issue because of the risk that they might be inter-
preted or used as trade barriers against emerging or 
less developed countries (ApexBrasil, 2012), but the 
benefits of such measures to promote sustainable 
development might outweigh these risks.
Benchmarking to Increase Energy Efficiency 
Environmental licensing through regulatory 
reforms applied by the Brazilian National Environ-
mental Council (CONAMA) could require increased 
energy-efficiency measures. This measure would 
make permits dependent on meeting industry-wide 
efficiency benchmarks that could boost perfor-
mance (increase efficiency) without inhibiting 
production. Benchmarking has been used widely 
in the European Union—in combination with 
other industrial policies—and has reduced energy 
intensity significantly over the period 1990 to 2007. 
Energy intensity has declined by 12 percent in the 
paper sector, 27 percent in cement and steel, and 
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55 percent in the chemical sector (Ernst & Young 
2012). In Brazil, industrial energy intensity could be 
improved by 4–10 percent over the period 2011-
2021 (MME, 2013; MMA, 2013b). For instance, 
subsectoral analyses can allow for more detailed 
benchmark curves. However, in the long term, 
many other sectors could reap benefits through 
improved processes, fuel switching, and waste 
recovery/recycling. Efficiency gains could reach 
above 50 percent for the glass sector, 30 percent 
for steel, and to clarify that category: 20 percent 
for cement, lime, pelleting and chemicals (ethene 
and ammonia), 15 percent for paper, ceramics and 
textiles and even 10 percent in the already efficient 
aluminum sector 2021 (MME, 2013; MMA, 2013b). 
Replacing Coal with Renewable Charcoal 
One form of sequestering carbon is through plant-
ing forests, and charcoal produced from such 
forests can provide an alternative, low-carbon fuel 
that could help decarbonize sectors such as iron 
and steel. With adequate supply chain logistics, in 
which biomass for charcoal is planted, harvested, 
and transported sustainably, renewable and sus-
tainable charcoal can be one of the top solutions to 
decarbonize some industry sectors (CGEE, 2014). 
The share of fuelwood in the total energy mix is 
expected to decline from 8.2 percent to 6.0 percent 
between 2013 and 2022 (EPE, 2013). Switching 
from coal and charcoal obtained through deforesta-
tion to charcoal from planted forests represents 
an important step in the decarbonization of the 
iron and steel subsector. This study recommends 
that the iron and steel industry move toward the 
replacement of coal (which is highly polluting and 
mostly imported) with renewable charcoal.6 The 
industry involves relatively few process units, which 
makes control and enforcement easier, at least in 
theory. However, replacing coal with renewable 
charcoal would require new facilities and/or major 
renovations of existing facilities (furnaces designed 
for coal burning do not operate with charcoal), as 
well as new energy supply infrastructure, which 
would ultimately result in higher input costs (CNI 
2012). The federal government, through its climate 
sectoral plans, could consider expanding charcoal 
use beyond the mere replacement of the fuel pro-
duced from deforestation, to include replacing coal 
and other fossil fuels used mainly by industry. We 
recommend that the updated version of the 2008 
National Plan on Climate Change, which is still 
under review, should consider this option.
Power-Generation Sector 
Context and trends
Brazil’s power-generation sector is undergoing 
a major transformation. Historically dominated 
by hydropower, a growing share of power is now 
generated from thermal electricity processes, 
including from fossil fuels (coal, natural gas, fuel 
oil, and diesel), biomass (sugarcane bagasse in 
particular) and, to a lesser extent, uranium. At 
the same time, the PDE 2023 projects significant 
growth in Brazil’s electricity demand over the next 
decade, resulting in the need for around six GW of 
additional installed capacity per year through 2023 
(EPE, 2014). Taken together, the trend toward a 
more carbon-intensive power sector, coupled with a 
higher demand for energy, would result in a sig-
nificant increase in GHG emissions. These trends, 
however, are not inevitable: estimates of growth in 
power demand were inflated in the PDE, and Brazil 
has significant renewable-energy potential, offering 
opportunities to green the power-generation sector.
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The scenarios reviewed above identify opportunities 
for both supply- and demand-side GHG reductions 
in the power sector. McKinsey (2009) considers 
the power sector only peripherally, but nonetheless 
identifies opportunities for 11 percent (190 MtCO2) 
potential emissions reductions in the power sector 
relative to official plans for 2030 (PNE2030). De 
Gouvello et al. (2011) examine supply-side mitiga-
tion options (wind and biomass cogeneration, fuel 
replacement by biomass/ethanol, and oil refining 
and gas-to-liquids), as well as demand-side options 
(such as energy efficiency in electricity consumption 
and reductions from industrial use of fossil fuels).7  
The abatement potential for the power sector is 
estimated at 11.7 Gt CO2e (between 2010 and 2030) 
or an average of 560 MtCO2e annually. Greenpeace 
(2013) indicates that the necessary GHG emis-
sion reductions will be possible if thermal-power 
plants running on fossil fuels are replaced by 
non-fossil-fuel powered plants as the energy supply 
is expanded. IEA’s Energy Technology Perspectives 
(ETP) suggest that, to achieve the 2°C pathway, key 
mitigation strategies in the power sector include 
decarbonization through investments in low-carbon 
technologies such as wind and solar, energy effi-
ciency, and carbon capture and storage (CCS). 
Policy options and implications for the technologies 
discussed in these various scenarios—including 
hydropower and interconnected renewables (for 
example, wind complementing hydropower)—are 
discussed below.
Increasing the Share of Wind and Solar in the 
Electricity Mix 
Investing in modern renewable energy sources 
(especially wind and solar) can enhance energy 
security, reduce GHG emissions, and create more 
jobs in Brazil (Pao and Fu, 2013). However, despite 
signals in the latest auctions that wind can compete 
with fossil sources and win (Fidelis da Silva et al., 
2012), these energy sources have received limited 
support in Brazil. Although the Terms of Refer-
ence for the upcoming National Energy Plan (PNE 
2050), elaborated by the Governmental Energy 
Research Company (EPE), indicate the relevance 
of investing in modern renewable energies such as 
wind and solar, the plan contrarily estimates a rela-
tive increase in energy supply from thermal power 
plants fueled by natural gas and coal. 
With regard to solar energy, as of 2015, photo-
voltaic solar energy contributes only 15 MW of 
installed capacity in Brazil (ANEEL, 2015). The 
high cost of solar energy per MWh is one of the 
greatest obstacles to the widespread use of solar 
PV in Brazil. The cost of solar PV energy was 
estimated at R$ 280.00 to R$ 300.00/MWh in 
2013 (Scalambrini, 2013). Other key challenges are 
related to the intermittency of renewable energy 
sources in Brazil (EPE, 2012; OESP, 2013; Oak and 
Sauer, 2012), and the lack of adequate incentives 
in Brazilian energy policy to disseminate the use of 
solar power. The Ten Year Energy Plan 2013–2022, 
for example, forecasts the generation of only 1,400 
MW of distributed generation via solar PV by 2022 
(PDE, 2014). However, the opportunity to invest in 
photovoltaic solar energy in Brazil is significant, not 
only because of the high incidence of solar radia-
tion, but also because of the increasing efficiency 
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and decreasing costs involved in implementing pho-
tovoltaic systems at the international and national 
levels (ABINEE, 2012). In 2015, tax levies on solar 
PV decentralized electricity are being removed, 
which in turn decreases the implementation costs of 
solar PV and accelerates the grid parity process. 
There are significant untapped opportunities 
for Brazil in this field: high solar irradiance, 
plunging costs, and a strong interaction of the 
photovoltaics sector with electronic components 
industries in terms of value chain. Electronic 
components are particularly important, both in 
terms of Brazil’s balance of trade and innovation. 
Semiconductors can be produced from the 
purification of electronics-grade silicon, with 
many co-benefits for other industrial sectors in the 
country. A suboptimal solution could be to produce 
silicon of lower quality (solar grade) through 
the metallurgical process, which is less energy 
intensive. But to achieve large-scale production, 
it is necessary to foster both supply and demand, 
motivating stakeholders to take advantage of 
the possible opportunities of assimilating new 
technology and the added value in local production 
at all supply chains. 
There is an intense debate over whether Brazil 
should develop a vertically integrated solar panels 
industry (including production of cells) or whether 
efforts should be concentrated in assembling mod-
ules and installing systems. On the supply side, it is 
necessary to have systemic measures to reduce cap-
ital, operational, and maintenance costs, including 
subsidies and other incentives (for cells, modules, 
and components); research and development (for 
example, for thin films or crystalline cells working 
under high temperatures); funding (for example, 
Fundo Clima and other BNDES funds); and robust 
standards, norms and regulation to avoid variable 
quality among regions (ABINEE, 2012). On the 
demand side, strong action is required from pub-
lic agents, especially from the Ministry of Mines 
and Energy (MMA), Ministry of Finance (MF), 
Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation 
(MCTi), ANEEL, and EPE, with specific bidding 
and relevant volumes of contracts, to provide more 
economies of scale. The regulatory environment 
must be favorable, with measures such as feed-in 
tariffs (FIT) and net metering schemes, as well as 
simplified procedures for grid access (for example, 
dispensing consultations and access reports, with 
swift processes concerning contracts and environ-
mental permits). 
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Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) has also vast 
potential in the arid regions of Brazil (Lucena et 
al., 2015), with a theoretical annual production of 
around 1900 TWh (Burgi, 2013). There is a growing 
literature about the prospects for CSP growth in 
Brazil. With storage or hybridization (the process 
of combining two complementary sources, such 
as CSP and biogas production systems) CSP could 
solve most of the problems of intermittency, but to 
date no projects have been initiated. The technology 
of CSP allows for energy storage using, for example, 
molten salts, which can be an advantage for inter-
mittency reduction (Lodi, 2011). Thermal collec-
tors for domestic hot water are already a mature 
technology, but one that is still not widely deployed 
because of barriers including initial capital costs 
and lack of a trained workforce to build installa-
tions. Collectors can also provide heat for com-
mercial cooling systems, heating swimming pools, 
and for other types of thermal comfort (Souza et 
al., 2010). All of these options are still seen by the 
government as peripheral, remaining outside main-
stream measures (Silva, 2015).
With regard to wind energy, several studies indicate 
the high potential of wind power in Brazil, but its 
contribution is still very modest—despite the highly 
competitive prices in the latest energy auctions. 
There are currently 242 installed windmills in Bra-
zil, which contribute 4.9 GW of installed capacity 
or 3.6 percent of the electricity supply (EPE, 2015), 
and account for avoided emissions of roughly five 
MtCO2e per year. The declining costs of generat-
ing wind energy in Brazil already demonstrate its 
potential and competitiveness when compared with 
natural gas and coal sources (Ricosti and Sauer, 
2013). Wind farms in Brazil have suffered from 
grid connection delays, a problem that has been 
addressed more recently. Technology is evolving 
rapidly, and the results of the latest auctions indi-
cated a considerable fall in the price of wind energy 
per MWh (Fidelis da Silva et al., 2012). 
Nevertheless, it is expected that modern renewable 
sources (mostly wind) will grow only from 4.3 per-
cent to 5.2 percent between 2013 and 2022 (EPE, 
2012), because natural gas or coal-fired power 
plants are still prioritized to meet baseload power 
needs (ACENDE, 2014).
High costs have long been a major obstacle to 
renewable electricity expansion in Brazil, which 
is now being overcome, notably by wind power 
(The Economist, 2013; EPE, 2012). However, 
uncertainty over the rules that regulate renewable 
electricity generation—and, until recently, artifi-
cially low prices to the consumer—have reduced the 
attractiveness of investments in renewable energy 
and discouraged end-user energy-efficiency mea-
sures. In 2015, soaring electricity prices are chang-
ing these equations, but many policymakers still 
consider the installation of more fossil-fueled power 
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plants, located near urban centers, to be the default 
choice. Given the delays in expanding the grid to 
include wind and solar energy sources, and the 
need to increase energy security, the government 
has decreased the share of renewable new capacity 
auctioned. At the same time, it has been increasing 
energy production from fossil-fuel power plants, 
especially coal-fired power plants, because they are 
relatively fast to build and connect to the grid. They 
also represent reliable (non-intermittent) sources 
that can provide energy over a longer time period. 
In order to increase the share of wind and solar PV 
sources in the Brazilian electricity mix, the govern-
ment has improved the auction system with source-
dedicated rounds, as part of an energy, climate, and 
industrial innovation policy instrument. In the case 
of photovoltaic energy, although costs are still high, 
the contracted volume of energy could represent 
a minimum guaranteed demand to underpin the 
scale requirements for local installation of pro-
ductive units, mainly modules. Auctions serve as 
an efficient instrument to identify the most cost-
effective technologies in Brazil, and could be further 
improved by factoring in the many co-benefits from 
modern renewable energy sources.
With the joint climate announcement by Presidents 
Barack Obama and Dilma Rousseff in June 2015, 
the United States and Brazil reinforced the urgency 
of tackling climate change and committed to 
increase the share of renewables (beyond hydro-
power) to 20 percent by 2030 in their electricity 
mixes (The White House, 2015). However, the 
announced commitments from Brazil appear not 
to be very ambitious. Reaching the target does not 
represent a major effort because of the direction 
in which Brazil is already moving (the PDE2023, 
for example, already forecasts a 20 percent share 
for non-hydro renewables in the electricity mix by 
2023 (EPE, 2014). Therefore, the federal govern-
ment could consider committing to increase the 
share of solar and wind to 30 percent by 2030 as 
part of Brazil’s intended nationally determined 
contribution (INDC) under the UNFCCC 2015 Paris 
Agreement. 
The government could also consider exempting for-
eign equipment and components for solar PV power 
generation from the Tax on Imports levy, and pro-
viding new lines of financing for solar PV genera-
tion equipment. Several countries, for example, the 
United States, are creating a series of incentives to 
encourage the broad expansion of the photovoltaic 
industry chain. The benefits include increasing local 
economic development, creating jobs, increasing 
access to renewable energy sources and, thereby, 
supporting national climate policies. These incen-
tives usually take the form of loans, financing, and 
tax cuts (ABINEE, 2012). The ANEEL Resolution 
482 of 2012, for example, established important 
incentives to encourage solar energy in small 
installations, including exemption from taxes and 
charges that are normally associated with inde-
pendent production and electricity consumption. 
Providing financial mechanisms adapted to small 
generation of photovoltaic modules could allow the 
expansion of these opportunities, scaling them up 
and reducing production costs for the necessary 
equipment. The BNDES could make available credit 
lines, including the existing lines under the Climate 
Fund Program of the Ministry of the Environment 
(MMA), which includes, as one of its objectives, 
supporting investment in solar power generation. 
Promoting Grid Interconnection of Renewables
Modern renewable electricity, integrated 
through smart grids, represents a key option to 
increase efficiency, decrease costs, and reduce 
GHG emissions from the power sector in Brazil. 
Interconnected renewables (modern renewable 
electricity complementing hydropower), especially 
wind and solar, could help to address many of 
the barriers—mentioned in previous sections— 
to increasing the share of wind and solar in the 
electricity mix. In particular, grid interconnection 
could help to overcome the problem of energy 
intermittence. 
Reducing vulnerability to climate variability in the 
power sector is highly dependent on the integration 
of different sources of energy, and resilience is also 
a key issue for energy infrastructure. This problem 
rose in prominence after severe droughts in 2001, 
2010, 2014, and 2015, which affected bioenergy 
supply. As a result, considerable amounts of lique-
fied natural gas (LNG) had to be shipped to Brazil-
ian ports at spot market prices (which means higher 
and volatile prices), in order to back up electricity 
generation (Gomes, 2014).
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New opportunities have been created with smaller 
and integrated power plant stations systems, 
such as plants based on small streams and small 
waterfalls, the reuse of biomass residues, and 
offshore wind farms (Soito and Freitas, 2011). 
While relying only on intermittent renewable 
energy sources, such as wind and solar, might 
not guarantee energy supply over the year, they 
could be used as a complementary power source 
or backup system. A wind-hydro hybrid scheme, 
for example, is a reasonable option that could be 
further explored in Brazil, because wind power 
potential in Brazil is comparable in scale to 
hydropower, and because Brazil has strong winds 
throughout the year, in contrast to the seasonal 
nature of water flow (Pau and Fu, 2013; Pimenta 
and Assireu, 2015). Wind power in the Northeast 
coast, for example, could complement hydropower 
supply during the dry season in that region (Alvim 
et al., 2005; Riscosti and Sauer, 2013). 
As integration among sources is improved, 
hydropower dispatch can be shifted from baseload 
to peak shaving, and intermittent sources become 
more stable as contributions to the grid from 
different regions smooth out variabilities. Smart 
grids and net metering8 can take this situation to 
another level, where data systems can also forecast 
variabilities more efficiently and in a more resilient 
way. A first measure to achieve this is to break out 
from the conventional generation-transmission-
distribution schemes by means of regulations that 
reduce bureaucracy and administrative barriers to 
decentralized electricity generation. 
A key policy recommendation to increase the share 
of wind and solar in the electricity mix and to 
promote grid interconnection of renewables is that 
the federal government should remove harmful 
incentives for fossil fuels, leveling the playing field 
so that alternative energy solutions can compete in 
a free market. The federal government could also 
encourage more investments in infrastructure for 
energy distribution and technological development 
aimed at local competitiveness, by creating 
more incentives to reduce production costs, 
and promoting deployment of manufacturing 
equipment in Brazil. These actions could increase 
the installed capacity of such sources and reduce 
production costs. Through better regulation and fair 
pricing (following the principle of the affordability 
tariff as defined by ANEEL, where even low-income 
consumers have the ability to access electricity and 
pay for it), wind and solar energy sources could be 
boosted to levels consistent with long-term low-
carbon pathways. Such policy options could offer 
important prospects for better energy integration 
and use of smart grids, with several co-benefits like 
job creation and improved environmental health. 
It would be important to provide more long-term 
loans for investments in wind and solar, and 
improve infrastructure to expand the grid with wind 
farms, as well as prioritize clean energy sources in 
energy auctions held by the Brazilian Chamber of 
Electric Energy Commercialization.
Promoting Grid Integration with  
Neighboring Countries
Energy integration is emerging as a highly relevant 
strategy to improve energy security in neighboring 
countries, mostly because of the benefits related 
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to economic complementarity among different 
countries. Grid integration also has the potential 
to reduce energy costs and diversify the energy 
mix (Carta Capital, 2015). Countries with a high 
exportable surplus of energy resources (such as 
Venezuela, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Peru) share 
borders with others that need to import energy to 
meet domestic demand (such as Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, and Uruguay).
Cross-border integration of the energy generation 
system can reduce the risk of failing to meet energy 
demands in a specific country, and a regional 
power grid offers the possibility of improved 
management of seasonality, intermittency, and 
complementarity of different renewable power 
sources, thus expanding their potential. In the case 
of Brazil, energy integration between the country 
and bordering countries is an option that can 
provide many joint benefits, in particular, increased 
reliability and security of supply of complementary 
national hydropower systems (EPE, 2014).
Brazil’s larger borders with neighboring countries 
include: Argentina 1,263 km, Bolivia 3,403 km, 
Colombia 1,790 km, Guyana 1,308 km, Paraguay 
1,371 km, Peru 2,659 km, Uruguay 1,050 km, and 
Venezuela 2,137 km. In addition to the Binational 
Itaipu Hydropower that encompasses Brazil and 
Paraguay, there are currently interconnections 
between Brazil and Argentina, Uruguay, and Ven-
ezuela (EPE, 2014). There are also some planning 
studies for the expansion of such joint investments, 
following the example of projects with Peru, Bolivia, 
and Guyana. These joint projects have been estab-
lished predominantly to generate renewable and 
low-cost energy, for example, through construction 
of hydroelectric dams. 
However, as of 2014, only 25 percent of the 
potential joint hydropower between Brazil and 
neighboring countries had been explored (EPE, 
2014). The construction of hydropower plants in 
trans-boundary areas, such as the hydropower 
plant in the Madeira River, is very challenging and 
requires monitoring stations and mechanisms for 
sharing hydrological data (Soito and Freitas, 2011).
Building national hydropower plants is complicated 
enough and, while reaching an agreement between 
two countries might be even more challenging, 
it could still be a reasonable way to increase the 
sustainable use of cross-border natural resources 
(IPS, 2012). Because the national grid is highly 
dependent on short- and medium-term water 
availability to generate energy, the need to 
guarantee that energy supply will meet demand is 
a critical issue, and it becomes imperative to take 
advantage of opportunities for regional integration 
(Soito and Freitas, 2011).
Besides hydropower plants, Brazil and Uruguay 
launched, in February 2015, a wind farm in 
Uruguay with generation capacity of 61.5 MW (the 
Artillero’s Park). Development of the wind project 
was originated in the “Agreement for Evaluation 
and Joint Development of wind farms for Power 
Generation Installed in the Eastern Republic of 
Uruguay,” signed in 2012 by Brazil and Uruguay. 
The project is part of a cooperation agreement 
between the Brazilian and Uruguayan Electric 
Utility Companies (Eletrobras and UTE) for the 
construction of up to 300 MW of wind power in 
Uruguayan territory (Brazil, 2015a). This is the 
first commercial investment by Eletrobras outside 
Brazil, and it constitutes part of the recognition 
that energy integration is needed to ensure a South 
American grid with better quality and cheaper 
electricity (Brazil, 2015b).
 
Additionally, the power grid of Brazil could benefit, 
and be of benefit, in a regional approach that seeks 
to lower the combined carbon footprint of power 
generation. The movement toward integration of 
regional economies, while usually argued in plain 
financial terms, could also result in substantial 
carbon benefits.
The federal government could recognize the rel-
evance of regional energy integration, and the 
possibility of expanding such interconnections, or 
establishing new interconnection grids, could be the 
subject of new international agreements between the 
Brazilian government and other relevant countries.
The government could also incentivize energy 
integration with neighboring countries through 
bilateral treaties focused on the shared use of water 
resources, for example, where the energy generated 
would be divided equally among the corresponding 
countries. As a preliminary step, it could be relevant 
to create more incentives for the elaboration of joint 
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hydropower project inventories and assessments 
of trans-boundary areas, as well as to enhance 
understanding of the hydro potential in neighboring 
countries, and identify joint opportunities for the 
implementations of new hydropower plants. 
To reproduce bilateral agreements like the 
Binational Itaipu with Paraguay, a supranational 
legal regime is required. A supranational legal 
framework—such as the one provided in the 
European Energy Charter on energy efficiency and 
related environmental aspects (EUR-LEX, 1997) 
that has been decisive for energy integration in 
Europe—would provide assurance to binational and 
multinational initiatives, as well as to institutional 
investors engaging in long-term return endeavors 
in South America. 
Increasing Energy Efficiency Requirements for 
Electrification and Buildings
In view of the current national energy landscape, 
increasing energy efficiency requirements for elec-
trification is an evident need (Pereira, Lambert, and 
Ghisi, 2013). Increasing energy efficiency could save 
consumers money, reduce the likelihood of future 
energy shortages, and reduce energy consumption 
and GHG emissions. 
Energy efficiency actions can be turned into 
kilowatt hours saved on the energy bill and hence 
into bottom-line savings, but this cannot be realized 
without good measurement. 
While mandatory efficiency standards have a role 
to play on the supply side, on the demand side, 
mechanisms such as rebates and feebates could 
create powerful incentives to drive the selection of 
more efficient equipment, including replacement of 
electric showers by solar systems. There are several 
opportunities for more vigorous action on energy 
efficiency on the demand side, including stronger 
product standards, and improved access to efficient 
equipment through financial and tax-favorable 
mechanisms. 
Improved equipment could be introduced through 
the creation of electronic equipment with energy 
self-service capacity: this service could be achieved 
through the use of small-scale solar energy 
powering low-potential equipment and perhaps 
charging small batteries in communication devices, 
among other things. The PNE 2050 includes 
this alternative and estimates a consumption 
reduction of approximately 24 TWh compared to 
the reference scenario, which represents seven 
percent of total electricity consumption (EPE, 
2015). However, this projection was done only for 
the Brazilian residential sector, but it could also be 
applied to the commercial sector.
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Globally, in the not-too-distant future, renewable 
and decentralized systems attached directly to 
buildings will provide electricity to smart grids, 
bringing reductions in electricity consumption of 
10 percent or more, as well as better stability of 
supply (fewer disruptions), and reduced baseload 
power generation from polluting sources (Lang and 
Mutschler, 2012).
Additionally, it would be important to increase 
the share of solar hot-water heating and decrease 
that of electric and natural-gas systems. The 
deployment of solar water heaters is already 
part of the current housing policy of the Federal 
Government; solar heating systems (SAS) must be 
included in the federal housing assistance program 
“Minha Casa, Minha Vida,” established by the state-
owned Brazilian bank “Caixa Economica Federal” 
and implemented by the Ministry of Cities (MC). 
The replacement of old and inefficient equipment 
that consumes a lot of energy is an important 
government policy. However, this type of initiative 
could be expanded to include more households. 
This energy-efficiency program presents some 
contradictions. For example, the program implies 
that the families that consume less energy 
receive more resources, but low-income families 
already consume much less energy than wealthier 
households. Additionally, in terms of reducing 
energy consumption, it would be important to 
broaden this kind of tax-relief program to focus 
additionally on large factories and the replacement 
of old and inefficient machines that consume far 
more energy than low-income households.
Governmental procurement is a powerful tool to 
influence markets. In the case of popular housing, 
the “Minha Casa, Minha Vida” (and other state or 
city programs) should pay close attention to the 
building standards for thermal and lighting com-
fort. The building envelope should utilize low-trans-
mittance materials, frames should provide natural 
ventilation and illumination, avoiding the use of air 
conditioners and artificial lighting as far as possible. 
Government buildings could be labeled under the 
Procel-Edifica Scheme. Recent developments by the 
Federal Government are intensifying these mea-
sures, and their importance should be highlighted 
in national energy and climate policies.
Commercial and public buildings offer significant 
possibilities for decentralized energy—both thermal 
and electric. Hybrid systems and cogeneration 
improve efficiency and resilience against power 
outages. Solar thermal heating reduces energy bills 
for heating water and, with improved technologies, 
even for cooling. Nevertheless, there are several 
misconceptions within the civil construction sector 
concerning these options, mostly because of the 
high initial capital costs and disregard for the life 
cycle cost of energy.
It is important to highlight the social disparities and 
regional heterogeneities in Brazil. Different climatic 
zones, urbanization patterns, and income levels 
require different perspectives for energy genera-
tion, consumption, efficiency, and GHG emission 
profiles. Improving socioeconomic indicators 
entails reducing inequalities, providing widespread 
and sufficient energy services, and ensuring envi-
ronmental quality. Among existing frameworks, 
one that could be adopted is the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) indicators that measure 
citizens’ access to affordable, reliable, sustainable, 
and modern energy (UNSDSN, 2015). Sustainable 
Development Goal 7 refers to energy and includes, 
among other indicators, access to modern cooking 
solutions and to reliable electricity generated by 
sustainable sources. It also includes incentives for 
low-carbon energy in the electricity sector and the 
rate of improvement in primary energy intensity. 
Reconciling the Role of Hydropower with Concern 
for Sustainability and Resilience
Large-scale deployment of hydropower has con-
tributed to Brazil’s position as a world leader in 
low-carbon energy development, and has generated 
important economic benefits, including limiting the 
country’s reliance on imported fossil fuels, enabling 
the expansion of access to modern energy services, 
and serving as a low-cost domestic energy source. 
Hydropower reservoirs have both positive and 
negative socioeconomic impacts: while they provide 
energy storage, flood control, multiple water uses 
throughout the year, and tourism development, 
among other goods, they cause damage including 
biodiversity loss, submersion of sensitive sites, 
and local population displacement. Trade-offs are 
extremely context-specific (Goldemberg and Lucon, 
2008; Sathaye et al, 2011). 
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Brazil still has 100GW in hydroelectric poten-
tial—and, in theory, such potential would easily 
be enough to meet the projected demand of six 
GW of additional installed capacity per year until 
2023 (EPE, 2023), while offering stability and low 
emissions (except for methane in certain instances). 
Despite this potential, forecasts indicate a gradual 
reduction in the relative share of hydropower in 
Brazil’s electricity-generation mix (EPE, 2014). The 
country has vast hydro resources still untapped: 
Of the 100GW in hydroelectric potential, 69.2 GW 
have been inventoried and only 16.7 GW of poten-
tial projects have had feasibility studies completed 
(Eletrobras, 2013). However, hydropower expan-
sion is facing significant barriers. These include: 
(i) lack of adequate public engagement at all stages 
of developing new projects; (ii) increasing public 
protest driven by social and environmental con-
cerns; (iii) lack of strong coordination between 
federal- and state-level governments; (iv) long and 
complicated licensing procedures; and (v) increas-
ing unreliability of hydropower because of climate 
change impacts. As a result of these factors, accord-
ing to the 2014 Brazilian National Energy Balance 
(BEN) the estimated available hydro potential 
declined from 50.5 GW in 2005 to 26.5 GW in 2013 
(BEN, 2014). Therefore, if hydropower is to play the 
increased role in the power sector that the govern-
ment plans for it, the aforementioned challenges 
will need to be proactively addressed. Potential 
solutions are both technological and governance-
focused, as discussed below. 
Streamline environmental license processes
The current environmental regulatory framework in 
Brazil requires a range of licenses for hydropower, 
resulting in high fees for the use, consumption, 
and discharge of water. Considering the multi-level 
nature of Brazilian environmental licensing laws, 
many projects face overlapping environmental 
jurisdictions at the federal and state levels. 
The costs increase even more if environmental 
licensing is delayed, which in turn leads to 
higher costs for licensed plants as they seek to 
meet energy demand (Soito and Freitas, 2011). 
New hydropower projects have been affected by 
difficulties in obtaining environmental licenses 
(especially for larger projects), which often leads 
to a reduction in the size of planned reservoirs 
for storage capacity. Consequently, the costs 
increase, as the share of supply sources changes 
because of the reduction in the planned reservoirs, 
which may lead to higher energy prices. It will be 
important to reduce the uncertainties regarding 
the environmental licensing process in plants 
that appear likely to impact protected areas, and 
IBAMA could streamline its environmental license 
process and promote better coordination with state 
agencies and other federal environmental agencies. 
Providing more regular revisions to update and 
contextualize environmental licensing rules could 
reduce such conflicts and political disputes without 
compromising the integrity of environmental 
protection.
Increase reliability and resilience of hydropower 
Global warming is likely to change the hydrological 
cycle, impacting the availability of water in 
Brazil’s drainage reservoirs (Soito and Freitas, 
2011). Severe droughts have reduced hydropower 
generation in recent years (2001, 2010, 2014, 
Overall, the reliance on 
baseload hydropower 
generation in Brazil 
is diminishing. If the 
government intends to 
maintain the major role 
of hydropower in the 
electricity mix, it will be 
important to promote 
grid interconnection 
with non-hydro modern 
renewables.
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2015). Hydropower—and especially run-of-the-
river hydropower projects with no reservoirs—is 
at risk from drought-induced reductions in water 
levels. The extent to which hydropower can be 
expanded will depend significantly on the ability 
to store water in reservoirs, because such power 
plants will then be somewhat independent of the 
rainfall regime (ONS, 2013b). Hydropower in the 
flat Amazon region is not able easily to include 
energy storage, because reservoirs have deep 
environmental and social implications, leading to 
the option of run-of-the-river projects with lower 
capacity factors. 
Overall, the reliance on baseload hydropower gen-
eration in Brazil is diminishing. If the government 
intends to maintain the major role of hydropower 
in the electricity mix, it will be important to pro-
mote grid interconnection with non-hydro modern 
renewables. Another option would be to increase 
national energy storage capacity in such a way that 
the additional generation possible during the wet 
season can be used during the dry season. Also, the 
Energy Research Company (EPE), the Electricity 
Regulatory Agency (ANEEL), and the major Elec-
tricity Utility Company (Eletrobras) could consider 
measures and policies to encourage investments 
in energy complementarity and storage capacity 
in regions other than the Amazon. Such measures 
could increase resilience during the dry seasons. 
There are also some other techniques that could 
support increased storage capacity in Brazilian 
watersheds (Hunt, Freitas, and Pereira Jr., 2014), 
such as enhanced-pumped-storage, pumped-stor-
age in cascade, additional storage reservoir dams, 
or retrofit of run-of-the-river dams into storage 
reservoir dams. Such systems result in less water 
loss through evaporation and have high storage 
efficiency (roughly 90 percent). However, although 
they could be a reasonable option to store energy 
from hydropower—because such systems require 
a substantially smaller flooded area to store water 
than traditional hydropower plants—it is important 
to highlight that over-reliance on pumped storage 
might undercut the benefits, because more energy is 
used pumping the water uphill than is gained when 
it is released. Finally, it is important to highlight the 
importance of increasing energy efficiency for elec-
trification to help decarbonize the energy-related 
GHG emissions sectors, and of deploying at large 
scale demand-side management (DSM) measures, 
in response to climate change. These measures 
could save consumers money, reduce the prob-
ability of future energy shortages, and, ultimately, 
reduce energy consumption and GHG emissions. 
Enhance public engagement at all stages  
of new projects
As of December 2014, there were 48 hydropower 
feasibility studies with installed capacity above 100 
megawatts registered at the National Electricity 
Regulatory Agency (ANEEL). Of these 48 studies, 
30 are located in tropical forests, with implied 
risks of delays or non-viability caused by lack of 
public acceptance. One major project represents 19 
percent of the total 31.6 GW; the top three projects 
cover 48 percent and the top seven cover more than 
73 percent, which means that if just one or two of 
these projects do not go through then much less of 
this potential will be delivered (ANEEL, 2014).
The fact that the remaining hydroelectric potential 
is located predominantly in the Amazon region, 
which also encompasses most of Brazil’s protected 
areas and indigenous communities, has several 
consequences for the development planning of 
power plants. Located in the Amazon Region, Belo 
Monte is the largest infrastructure work in progress 
in Brazil, and because of socio-environmental con-
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cerns and lack of public acceptance, it is expected 
to take more than three decades to move from its 
initial announcement to operations. The originally 
planned size of the reservoir was reduced by 58 per-
cent and the current installed capacity is approxi-
mately 11 GW (ANEEL, 2015), and the plant’s 
estimated costs doubled. Even so, opponents of the 
project believe that the case of Belo Monte will set 
a precedent for other large projects in the Amazon 
region that could be detrimental going forward 
(EPE, 2011; ANEEL, nd; ISA, nd; Pereira 2013). 
Policy recommendations to overcome lack of 
public acceptance of new projects include that 
the federal government could encourage higher 
public engagement in all stages of such projects, 
and developers could create permanent and more 
effective channels of communication with local 
people who will be affected over the whole cycle 
of the project. Although the need to manage the 
process better to gain public acceptance is relevant, 
it is important to highlight that addressing the real 
socio-environmental concerns as part of the project 
is the key issue to gain public acceptance, because 
public rejection is often motivated by genuine 
concerns and real issues with hydropower projects. 
Therefore, dealing with this issue does not imply 
only overcoming public resistance but also making 
decisions that incorporate the negative externalities 
based on understanding the specific local context 
and trade-offs. 
Reconsidering an Emission Performance Standard 
(EPS) for Fossil-Fuel Power Plants
In order to reduce GHG emissions from fossil-fuel 
power plants and encourage the growth of modern 
renewables in the electricity mix, the federal gov-
ernment could also reconsider establishing an emis-
sion performance standard (CO2 EPS) for fossil-fuel 
power plants that was adopted in 2009 but subse-
quently revoked (discussed further below). An EPS 
could play a key role in the development and imple-
mentation of climate policies in different countries, 
and it could accelerate the process of generating 
energy efficiently, while enabling the development 
and dissemination of advanced technologies to 
reduce GHG emissions (Romeiro, 2014). A CO2 
EPS could also be relevant to foster the deployment 
of certain clean technologies that otherwise are 
unlikely to be viable at the commercial scale, such 
as carbon capture and storage. 
Over the past few years, many countries and states 
have attempted to create EPS for fossil-fired power 
plants (Table 4).
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Most of the countries and states have established 
restriction limits of 1,100 lbs of CO2/MWh. The 
most stringent carbon emission restriction (EPS 
level) has been proposed by Canada (825 lbs of CO2/
MWh), followed by the rejected United Kingdom 
EPS proposal (880 lbs. of CO2/MWh). Only new 
plants were included in the standards, except Brazil 
(revoked) and Scotland (where the EPS states that all 
fossil-fired power plants, planned and existing, will 
have to comply with the EPS by 2025). 
Table 4  |   CO2 EPS for Fossil-Fuel Power Plants Worldwide
COUNTRY OR STATE EPS LEVEL TYPE OF PLANT
Canada    825 lbs. of CO
2
/MWh 375 kg CO
2
/MWh New/existing
United Kingdom    880 lbs. of CO
2
/MWh 400 kg CO
2
/MWh New (rejected)
U.S. New York      925 lbs. CO
2
/MWh 420 kg CO
2
/MWh New
U.S. Federal ~1,000 lbs. of CO
2
/MWh 454 kg CO
2
/MWh New
Australia  1,100 lbs. of CO
2
/MWh 500 kg CO
2
/MWh New
European Union  1,100 lbs. of CO
2
/MWh 500 kg CO
2
/MWh New
U.S. California  1,100 lbs. of CO
2
/MWh 500 kg CO
2
/MWh New
U.S. Maine  1,100 lbs. of CO
2
/MWh 500 kg CO
2
/MWh New
U.S. Oregon  1,100 lbs. of CO
2
/MWh 500 kg CO
2
/MWh New
U.S. New Mexico  1,100 lbs. of CO
2
/MWh 500 kg CO
2
/MWh New
U.S. Washington  1,100 lbs. of CO
2
/MWh 500 kg CO
2
/MWh New
AU South Austr.  1,540 lbs. of CO
2
/MWh 700 kg CO
2
/MWh New
Germany  1,694 lbs. of CO
2
/MWh 700 kg CO
2
/MWh New
AU Victoria  1,760 lbs. of CO
2
/MWh 800 kg CO
2
/MWh New (abandoned)
Scotland CCS New/existing
AU Queensland Clean coal (with CCS) New
AU Western Austr. Clean coal (with CCS) New
U.S. Montana CCS — at least 50 percent of CO
2
New
U.S. Illinois CCS — 50, 70 or 90 percent of CO
2
New
Brazil Reforestation, en. Efficiencya New/existing (revoked)
Source: Romeiro, 2014.
a Compliance with carbon sequestration/reforestation and investments in energy efficiency
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BOX 2  |   ENERGY GOVERNANCE AND COORDINATION CHALLENGES FOR  
ENERGY AND CLIMATE IN BRAZIL
Ministry of 
Energy (MME)
Ministry of 
Transport (MT)
Ministry of 
Environment 
(MMA)
Civil Aviation 
Secretariat
National Agency 
of Petroleum, 
Natural Gas, 
and Biofuels 
(ANP)
National Land 
Transport 
Agency (ANTT)
Electricity 
Regulatory 
Agency (ANEEL)
National 
Agency for 
Waterways 
(ANTAQ)
National Water 
Agency (ANA)
National Civil 
Aviation Agency 
(ANAC)
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
In 2009, the Brazilian Institute of Environment and 
Renewable Natural Resources (IBAMA) published 
the Normative Instruction No. 07/2009. The 
Normative Instruction referred to the UNFCCC 
and to the 2008 Brazilian National Plan on Climate 
Change, and stated that the environmental license 
for new fossil-fuel power plants would need to 
include a Mitigation Program to reduce CO2 
emissions. The instruction established the following 
criteria to achieve such emissions reductions: 
(i) at least one third of the CO2 emissions would 
need to be mitigated by reforestation; (ii) up to 
two thirds of the CO2 emissions would need to be 
mitigated through investments in renewable energy 
or measures to promote energy efficiency (IBAMA, 
2009). However, the Normative Instruction was 
revoked in 2010 (see below). 
The IBAMA Normative Instruction no 07/2009 
was clearly intended to reduce CO2 emissions while 
promoting the increased use of renewable energy. 
Nevertheless, it created an obligation on the part 
of a UNFCCC Non-Annex I country to reduce 
its CO2 emissions. The Normative Instruction 
therefore provoked contentious discussion because 
of its impact on Brazilian projects under the clean 
development mechanism (CDM). As a result, it 
was revoked one year after its creation, through 
the IBAMA Normative Instruction No. 12/2010 
(IBAMA, 2010). The government could reconsider 
establishing such an EPS for fossil-fuel power 
plants in Brazil as an attempt to discourage the 
continued increase of fossil-sourced power.
Opportunities to Improve  
Integration between Climate and 
Energy Policies in Brazil
In terms of energy governance in Brazil, six 
agencies under three ministries (and one 
presidential secretariat) have supervision over 
energy regulation at the federal level, as shown 
in Box 2. These ministries also participate with 
13 others in the Inter-ministerial Committee on 
Climate Change (CIMC). 
Nevertheless, under the Ministry of the Environ-
ment (MMA), environmental bodies, such as the 
Institute of Environment and Renewable Natural 
Resources (IBAMA) do not regulate energy poli-
cies, and because IBAMA is the environmental 
regulatory body that approves the operation of new 
energy projects at the federal level, energy planners 
cannot foresee whether environmental licensing 
for new developments will be approved, even if the 
necessary requirements are reached. Moreover, 
conflicting directives among different areas of gov-
ernment and pressures from the private sector to 
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speed development in the energy sector frequently 
result in environmental authorities being accused 
of delaying Brazil's economic development with 
complex licensing procedures and rules.
In December 2009, the Brazilian Government 
launched the National Policy on Climate Change 
(PNMC) through Federal Law No. 12.187/2009. 
In line with its submission to the UNFCCC, the 
PNMC pledged Brazil to a 36.1–38.9 percent 
reduction in GHG emissions by 2020, relative to a 
trend line scenario. A year later, Decree 7.390 was 
established to regulate the PNMC, and stated that 
the 2020 commitments should be achieved through 
mitigation and adaptation sectoral plans. It has also 
decreed that the Ten-Year Energy Expansion Plan 
(PDE), revised and updated on an annual basis, 
should constitute the Energy Sectoral Plan for 
mitigation and adaptation to climate change, which 
means that energy-related climate policies in Brazil 
are defined by the Ministry of Mines and Energy.
The Ten-Year Energy Plan is supposed to represent 
Brazil’s official sectoral plan to address climate 
change. However, because it prioritizes economic 
development over climate-change concerns, the 
scientific recommendations to deeply reduce GHG 
emissions are not fully heeded and the necessary 
shifts in priorities to efficiently tackle climate 
change in Brazil are not sufficiently considered. 
Changes in the business-as-usual (BAU) GHG 
emission projections between the 2009 Brazilian 
commitments under the Copenhagen Accord  
and the 2010 Decree of the National Policy on 
Climate Change: implications for energy-related  
GHG emissions
The first problem is the unexplained revision 
(increase) of projected GHG emissions under the 
Brazilian business-as-usual (BAU) scenario. The 
original BAU projection for 2020, announced in 
November 2009 as part of the Copenhagen Accord, 
was 2.7 GtCO2e. However, the National Decree 
7.390 of 2010, which regulates the PNMC, revised 
and increased the BAU GHG emissions for 2020 to 
3.2 GtCO2e—which represents an increase of more 
than 18 percent, as shown in Table 5.
In addition, because Brazil’s pledge is framed as a 
percentage reduction relative to the baseline level, 
the total 2020 emissions associated with achieving 
the pledge depend entirely on the definition of the 
baseline. The higher the BAU, the lower will be 
Brazil’s ambition, because the country will be able to 
meet its pledge with a smaller reduction in emissions.
Table 5  |   Brazilian Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions (NAMAs): Changes in the  
Business-as-Usual GHG Emission Projections for 2020
SECTOR
2020 BASELINE EMISSIONS (MT CO2E)
PERCENT 
CHANGEGHG EMISSIONS PROJECTED BY 2020 UNDER THE 
COPENHAGEN ACCORD
GHG EMISSIONS PROJECTED BY 2020 
UNDER THE DECREE OF THE NATIONAL 
POLICY ON CLIMATE CHANGE
Agriculture 627 730 + 16.4
Industry and Waste 92 234 + 254.3
Energy 901 868 - 3.6
Land-Use Change 1.084 1.404 + 29.5
Total 2.703 3.236 + 19.71
         
Source: Brazil, 2009 and Brazil, 2010.
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The same decree states that the 2020 targets 
will be achieved through sectoral mitigation and 
adaptation plans, which means that such sectoral 
plans are based on the aforementioned higher 
baseline projection (3.2 GtCO2 instead of the 
first announcement of 2.7 Gt CO2), which make 
the commitments under the 2010 Decree of the 
National Policy on Climate Change less ambitious 
than the voluntary pledge submitted to the 
UNFCCC in 2009. 
Regarding the energy sector, the 2010 Decree 
establishes that the Ten-Year Energy Plan and 
its updates constitute the energy sector plan for 
mitigation and adaptation to climate change. 
Because the plan includes efforts to increase 
renewables, nuclear, and energy efficiency, the 
Brazilian NAMAs were then translated into 
targets for the energy sector under PDE 2022, as 
represented in Table 6.
Table 6  |   Energy Sector 2020 Targets (Decree 
7.390/2010)
2020 OUTLOOK MTCO2E
Projected emissions (trendline) 868
Trendline—target abatement 188 to 234
Emission target 634 to 680
Source: Brazil, 2010.
The pledge itself, however, established a weaker 
target than originally expected because of Brazil’s 
adjustment of the business-as-usual scenario 
against which reductions are to be measured. Three 
factors play an important role:
1. Lack of revisions to the baseline of the National 
Policy on Climate Change and the expectation of 
high economic growth with virtually no decoupling
Another problem is the lack of revisions to the 
baseline to take account of the global economic 
crisis and other macroeconomic trends. As the 
economic and political circumstances of a country 
change over time, the original data used to create a 
target (emissions drivers, assumptions, or included 
policies and measures) might become less pertinent 
or might be revealed to be inaccurate. The baseline 
scenario and associated emissions estimates then 
need to be reconsidered. The WRI GHG Protocol 
Mitigation Goals Standard (WRI, 2012) provides 
some examples of changes that would require 
revisions to the baseline (Box 3).
As part of the revision and recalculation process, 
the country should establish and disclose its 
significance threshold in a consistent manner. 
In the case of Brazil, the current energy plans 
forecast expansion in the total (end-use) fuel 
consumption. Such expansion, however, was scaled 
back from PDE 2019 to PDE 2022, as a result of 
the 2008 global economic crisis. This retreat did 
not, however, lead to a revision of the underlying 
assumptions of Brazil’s climate pledges. Brazilian 
climate policies have not changed since 2010, while 
the Ten-Year Energy Plans are adjusted each year 
(the latest, PDE 2023, was released by EPE at the 
end of 2014). The changes in the baseline for the 
 ▪ Structural changes in the jurisdiction that have a 
significant impact on its baseline scenario emissions, 
including: 
 ▪ Changes in calculation methodologies, including: 
 □ updated inventory calculation method 
 □ improvements in the accuracy of emission factors or 
activity data 
 □ changes in GWP values
 ▪ Changes in goal boundary, including sectors, gases, or 
geographic area 
 ▪ Discovery of significant error(s) in original calculations 
 ▪ Any other significant changes that would otherwise com-
promise the consistency and relevance of the reported 
GHG emissions information.
Source: WRI GHG Protocol Mitigation Goals Standard
BOX 3  |   EXAMPLES OF CHANGES THAT 
WOULD REQUIRE REVISIONS TO 
BASELINES
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energy sector, allied with the lack of ambition of 
the PDEs to reduce GHG emissions, cast doubt on 
whether these plans can be considered as medium- 
to long-term instruments of climate policy in Brazil, 
as determined by Decree 7.390/2010.
2. The EPE forecast for growth in the energy sector 
is based on two non-practical assumptions:
The first is that average GDP growth assumed 
in the Ten-Year Energy Plan is five percent per 
year, while, in practice, GDP growth has averaged 
approximately 3.4 percent per year since 2010, fall-
ing to 0.4 percent in 2014. 
3. Non-LUC sectors had their BAU trend lines 
based on expectations of a high GDP growth rate. 
For industry, waste, and agriculture it was esti-
mated to be five percent per year over the period 
2006 to 2020—a total increase of 97 percent. The 
energy sector was expected to grow at 4.8 percent 
per year (EPE, 2013). From 2006 to 2012, Brazil-
ian GDP grew 4.2 percent per year. According to 
the IMF (2015) growth was 2.7 percent in 2013, 0.1 
percent in 2014 and forecasts indicate growths of 
negative 1.5 percent in 2015 and positive 0.7 per-
cent in 2016. The official estimate of GDP growth 
for the present year, as of June 2015, is -1.3 percent 
(Central Bank of Brazil, 2015). 
The EPE forecast for growth in the energy sec-
tor is much higher than the reality, and GDP and 
energy demand is not decoupled, which means 
that the efficiency of the economy is assumed not 
to improve. EPE’s outlooks of six GW of additional 
installed capacity per year may be an overestimate, 
based on GDP assumptions alone. The second 
assumption is that GDP and energy demand will 
not be decoupled—in other words, the efficiency of 
the economy will not improve. It is important to 
decouple expectations of growth in energy demand 
from expectations of economic growth (Lucon, 
Romeiro, and Pacca, 2013).
In light of these issues, there is ample opportunity 
to strengthen energy and climate policies in Brazil. 
The first necessary action is to acknowledge the 
considerable lock-in risks posed by current energy 
and climate policies. Despite remarkable improve-
ments in deforestation control, changing patterns 
of emissions pose considerable threats for Brazil 
after 2020, and the present narrative of mitiga-
tion strategies undertaken by the government may 
not endure for long. More specifically, the federal 
government should update the baseline announced 
by the Decree 7.390 of 2010, because the inflated 
baselines represent steep increases in emissions 
that are not consistent with historical trends and 
forecasts.
Another necessary action is to consider revisions 
to the baseline based on the global economic 
crisis/other macroeconomic trends, for example, 
under the provisions established by the WRI GHG 
Protocol Mitigation Goals Standard (mentioned 
above). It will be important to decouple the emis-
sions reduction pledges from the expectations on 
economic growth, given that current trends present 
relatively small improvements in efficiency and 
decarbonization. The 36.1 percent–38.9 percent 
reduction pledges under the National Policy on 
Climate Change (Brazil, 2009) actually translate to 
a reduction of only 15–18 percent when 2005 is the 
baseline year, and the contribution from the energy 
sector is even lower. 
It would be important to create comprehensive 
metrics to decouple expectations of growth in 
energy demand from expectations of economic 
growth (Lucon, Romeiro, and Pacca, 2013). Some 
indicators to be monitored at the national and 
subnational levels could be considered, such as 
efficiency improvements in final energy use, reduc-
tion in energy consumption, and mitigation of 
GHG emissions. A monitoring process, accessible 
to the public at large and based on quantifiable 
dimensions, would be relevant to move from public 
policy rhetoric to results-driven climate and energy 
policies. Metrics regarding generation, consump-
tion, efficiency, and GHG emissions could help civil 
society to follow up on sound policy implementa-
tion and bring about meaningful results.
Given that the Ten-Year Energy Expansion Plan 
(PDE) constitutes the energy sector’s climate 
plan, climate change concerns are subordinate 
to economic growth in Brazil. On the eve of the 
Paris Climate Change Conference, the federal 
government could consider effectively integrating 
climate policies more fully into the sectoral  
energy plan. 
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CONCLUSIONS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS
Until the early years of the 21st century, climate change 
mitigation in Brazil was almost exclusively, and rightly, 
associated with forests and land-use change. The absolute 
volume of GHG emissions produced by unsustainable 
deforestation and agricultural practices was overwhelming, 
while the carbon intensity of Brazil’s energy mix was 
relatively low. That is changing.
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While Brazil’s energy sector is relatively efficient, 
with moderately low carbon intensity (because 
of the significant use of biofuels for transport, 
the relative efficiency of iron and steel produc-
tion, and the major role of hydropower), current 
policy approaches leave a lot of opportunities “on 
the table.” A combination of efforts to increase 
efficiency and the share of all forms of renewable 
energy in the national energy mix could reinforce 
Brazil’s position as a low-carbon economy—which 
is currently in jeopardy—and deliver many other 
benefits to its citizens, including better air qual-
ity, enhanced and cleaner mobility, and overall 
improvements in quality of life. Reflecting these 
opportunities in its approach to international 
climate policy, likewise, would reinforce Brazil’s 
position as a leader in the international community 
and enhance pressure on other major economies 
to implement international best practices. This, 
in turn, would create a further competitive advan-
tage for Brazilian industry, which is already more 
efficient than the global average. 
Due in part to the lack of historical association 
between the energy sector and climate-change 
mitigation in Brazil, climate change has not been 
considered thoroughly in national energy policy. 
The existing annual Ten-Year Energy Plan, with its 
conservative assumptions and modest efficiency 
improvements, was simply adopted as the mitiga-
tion and adaptation sectoral plan for the energy 
sector to represent climate policy. Sectoral climate 
plans that have an impact on the energy sector, like-
wise, do little to enhance ambition relative to the 
annual Ten-Year Energy Plan. They have been slow 
to be developed and implemented, lack specificity 
and priority, and ignore significant, cost-effective 
potential abatement options.
In contrast to many other major emerging 
economies, Brazil’s energy mix is becoming more 
carbon intensive, not less, because of increased 
reliance on fossil fuels, heavy investments in the 
Pre-Salt oil fields, subsidies to keep gasoline prices 
artificially low, and tax subsidies that encourage the 
purchase of new cars, among other reasons. 
A variety of scenarios have identified key technolo-
gies and cost-effective abatement opportunities 
that offer emissions reductions of approximately 40 
percent relative to the baseline. (Some very recent 
studies are in the process of publication, or were 
published too late for inclusion in this report, and 
have not been included in this analysis.) Public 
policy recommendations evaluated in this report 
indicate that a different future is possible for GHG 
emissions from Brazil’s energy sector if significant 
efforts are made to overcome existing barriers. It 
is important to highlight that this report did not 
attempt to discuss other key related questions 
such as equity, fairness, and financing, despite their 
significance in international climate negotiations. 
Although these issues will play an important role both 
domestically and internationally, the aim of this 
report was to focus on national circumstances and 
initiatives that could improve the integration between 
existing climate and energy policies in Brazil.
Keeping in mind that Brazil has many disparities 
and regional differences, we propose a 
comprehensive set of public policy priorities, 
stemming from the recognition that high-
carbon lock-in is a risk, both to Brazil’s economy 
and to the global climate. It is very unlikely 
that decarbonization and energy efficiency 
improvements will proceed at the necessary pace 
without a strong policy signal to guide public and 
private investment. The policy priorities proposed 
below address the key energy subsector emitters 
(transport, industry, and power generation), as well 
as opportunities for more integration between the 
energy sector and climate policies:
Transport
 ▪ Accelerate the implementation of fuel-economy 
standards and bring them into line with best 
international practice ▪ Diversify and integrate modal transportation 
systems for freight and public transport by 
conducting scoping studies on rail for freight 
transportation and high-speed rail for public 
transport; developing high-capacity bus and rail 
systems in high-demand areas; and increasing 
investment in low-emission transportation 
modes ▪ Offer municipalities incentives to create local 
mass-transport plans ▪ Streamline licensing for key rail and waterway 
projects ▪ Establish carbon pricing for transport
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 ▪ Promote the use of biofuels while ensuring that 
they do not cause negative land-use changes  ▪ Provide incentives to encourage the inclusion 
of hybrids and electrical vehicles in the energy 
transportation mix over the next 20 years ▪ Establish public procurement of cleaner fuel 
and vehicles as a strategy to promote a more 
sustainable transport system
Industry
 ▪ Accelerate implementation of an MRV system 
as a basis for creation of a carbon market ▪ Implement Brazilian Market for Emission 
Reductions ▪ Develop LCA-based benchmarks and labels to 
differentiate products ▪ Leverage environmental licensing to improve 
efficiency ▪ Accelerate plans to replace coal with renewable 
biomass
Power generation
 ▪ Invest in the development of wind and solar 
technologies aimed at competitiveness ▪ Hold dedicated auctions for modern 
renewables, incorporating fair pricing practices ▪ Provide more long-term loans for grid 
infrastructure ▪ Incentivize energy integration through bilateral 
treaties focused on the shared use of water 
resources ▪ Increase the share of wind and solar PV sources 
in the electricity mix ▪ Consider a commitment to increase the share of 
solar and wind in the energy mix to 30 percent 
by 2030 as part of Brazil’s intended nationally 
determined contribution (INDC)  ▪ Explore the options for new storage 
technologies to reduce the social and 
environmental impacts of large hydropower 
projects, while increasing their resilience to 
climate change ▪ Reconsider establishing an EPS for fossil-fuel 
power plants ▪ Develop a regulatory framework for carbon 
capture and storage
Integration between climate and energy  
policies in Brazil
 ▪ Adopt rigorous metrics, at national and 
subnational level, to track the decoupling of 
economic growth from natural resource use. 
Possible indicators include: (a) efficiency 
improvements in final energy use, (b) reduction 
in energy consumption, and (c) mitigation of 
GHG emissions  ▪ Revise the baseline of the National Policy on 
Climate Change and its decree, based on inter-
national standards and best practices ▪ Establish a monitoring process, accessible to 
the public at large and based on quantifiable 
dimensions. This would help with moving from 
public policy rhetoric to results-driven climate 
and energy policies, and address barriers ▪ Review the sectoral plans regularly (every 
other year) with a view to enhancing ambition 
over time, as implementation improves and 
technology and financing options advance ▪ Establish a robust, periodic review process 
for national climate policies and plans that 
is transparent about assumptions and that is 
participatory, with an ample public comment 
period and a mandate to respond to public 
comments ▪ Consider the implications of integrating global 
carbon budget constraints into Brazil’s climate 
plan for the energy sector, with due regard for 
equity, fairness, technology support, finance, 
and other issues of particular concern to non-
Annex I Parties ▪ Integrate ambitious energy targets into Brazil’s 
INDC—first in Paris, and then with a view to 
ratcheting up targets every five years, or some 
other time frame that is determined to be 
appropriate
This ambitious agenda will require political 
leadership at the highest levels, strong coordination 
across line ministries and up and down 
jurisdictional levels, as well as participation of 
the private sector and civil society. The rewards, 
however, are significant—cost savings, health 
benefits, enhanced competitiveness, and an 
improved quality of life for the citizens of Brazil—
and enhanced Brazilian leadership in climate policy 
at the global level. 
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ENDNOTES
1. CO
2
, CH
4
, N
2
O, HFCs, PFCs, and SF
6.
2. Such values are applicable for the “GHG worst case scenario,” 
that is, when the flex vehicle is running on Brazilian gasohol 
(a test-driving gasoline blended with 22 percent of anhydrous 
ethanol, also called E22).
3. It is estimated that the subsidy policies practiced by the gov-
ernment led to a tax waiver of approximately USD 350 million 
per month in 2013. The value corresponds to the exemption 
of the Intervention Contribution in the Economic Domain 
(CIDE) on gasoline and diesel, according to calculations of the 
Brazilian Infrastructure Centre (Brasil Econômico, 2013). As of 
2015, ending all subsidies for gasoline and diesel could imply 
savings of approximately USD 4.5 billion per year, and these 
savings could be used to support the broad dissemination of 
modern renewable energy-based systems (EBC, 2015).
4. From 8,173 PJ (peta-joules) in 2010 to a reference 17,040 PJ 
in 2050 or alternative 12,600 PJ in this same year.
5. These assumptions are subject to uncertainties related to future 
economic development in the country, which are not captured 
by this analysis or, to any great extent, by the official plans.
6. This is only applicable to basic oxygen furnaces.
7. The potential for increasing nuclear and hydropower was not 
considered, because of the need for long-term planning for 
nuclear plants and challenges related to environmental licenses 
and climate impacts on the water regimes underpinning 
hydropower.
8. Building-integrated photovoltaics (BIPV), though still a novelty 
in Brazil, gained more momentum after the recent changes 
in regulations for net metering (ANEEL Resolution 482 of 
2012, National Council of Fiscal Policy (CONFAZ) decision to 
exempt electricity bidirectional flows from taxes as a way to 
ease the connection of small power generation plants to the 
grid by using renewable sources). This resolution proposed 
the establishment of an energy compensation system to enable 
the additional electricity generated in a small power plant to 
be released into the grid. The regulation also established that 
the remaining credits of electricity at the close of a contract 
between consumers and distributors may not be subject to any 
form of compensation to the consumers.
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
ANA National Water Agency
ANAC National Civil Aviation Agency 
ANEEL Electricity Regulatory Agency 
ANP  National Agency of Petroleum, Natural Gas, 
and Biofuels 
ANTAQ National Agency for Waterways 
BECCS Bio Energy with Carbon Capture and Storage 
BOE Barrels of Oil Equivalent 
BRT Bus Rapid Transit 
CCS Carbon Capture and Storage
CIDE Economic Domain Intervention Contribution 
CIMGC  Inter-Ministerial Commission on Global 
Climate Change 
CO
2
 Carbon Dioxide 
COFINS Contribution to Social Security Financing 
CONAMA National Environmental Council 
CONTRAN National Traffic Council 
COP Conference of the Parties 
CTPIn Technical Commission on the Industry Plan 
CVM  Brazilian Securities and Exchange 
Commission 
DENATRAN National Department of Traffic 
EOR Enhanced Oil Recovery 
EPE Energy Research Company 
EPS Emission Performance Standard 
ETP Energy Technology Perspectives 
FA Logistics Adjustment Factor 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GHG Greenhouse Gas 
GW Gigawatts 
IBAMA  Institute of Environment and Renewable  
Natural Resources 
IEA International Energy Agency 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
IPI Industrialized Products Tax 
IPPU Industrial Processes and Product Use  
LCA Life Cycle Analysis 
LNG Liquefied Natural Gas 
LULUCF Land Use, Land-Use Change and Forestry 
MBRE Brazilian Market for Emission Reduction 
MCTi Ministry of Science and Technology 
MDIC  Ministry of Development, Industry, and Foreign 
Commerce 
MF Ministry of Finance 
MMA Ministry of Environment 
MME Ministry of Mines and Energy 
MRV Measurement, Reporting, and Verification 
MT Ministry of Transport 
MW Megawatts 
NAMAs Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions 
NEDC New European Driving Cycle 
PDE Ten-Year Energy Expansion Plan 
PIS/PASEP  Contribution to the Social Integration Program 
and Civil Service Asset Formation Program 
Plan-Mob National Mobility Plan 
PNE National Energy Plan 
PNLT National Plan of Logistics and Transport 
PNMC National Policy on Climate Change 
PPCDAM  Action Plan for Prevention and Control of 
Deforestation in the Legal Amazon 
PPCerrado  Action Plan for the Prevention and Control of 
Deforestation and Forest Fires in the Cerrado 
PROCONVE Vehicle Air Pollution Control Program 
PRODES  Satellite Monitoring System of the 
Brazilian Amazon Forest 
PSTM  Sectoral Plan for Transport and Urban 
Mobility for the Mitigation of Climate Change 
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
SEEG Brazilian Greenhouse Gas Emissions System 
SeMob  National Secretariat of Transport and Urban 
Mobility 
tCO
2
e Tonnes of CO
2
 equivalent 
TOR Terms of Reference 
UNFCCC  United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change
UNSDSN  United Nations Sustainable Development Solu-
tions Network 
WB World Bank 
WEO World Energy Outlook 
WG Inventories Working Group on Inventories
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Summary of Scenarios 
This section presents an analysis of the assumptions and results of 
the following energy scenarios, in order of year of publication, as set 
out Table A1-1.
The National Energy Plan—PNE 2030 (2007) is the official 
government scenario. It shows emissions in 2030 being reduced 
to 815 MtCO
2
e or 16 percent below the projected trend line of 
975 Mt CO
2
e in 2030 (using a baseline of 329 MtCO
2
e in 2005, 
500 Mt CO
2
e in 2010, and 437 MtCO
2
e in 2012) (last historical 
figure). The main reductions were projected to result from replacing 
charcoal from deforestation with charcoal produced from renew-
able plantations (representing 31 percent of the total potential of 
the energy sector estimated by the PNE) and phasing out the use of 
nonrenewable energy sources in industry by 2030. PNE 2030 shows 
basically four scenarios, in a quite broad range of possibilities. In 
the intermediate reference, emissions in 2030 are reduced to 815 
ANNEX 1. DETAILS FROM THE SCENARIO ANALYSIS
Table A1-1  |  Summary of Scenarios
AUTHOR OR  
ORGANIZATION
YEAR OF 
PUBLICATION
SCENARIO MODELING APPROACH TIME 
HORIZON
Energy Research Company 2007 National Energy Plan 2030 Current policy scenario 2030
McKinsey 2009 Low-carbon economy Most cost-effective abatement technology 2030
World Bank 2010 Reference Current policy scenario 2030
World Bank 2010 Low-Carbon Scenario Most cost-effective abatement technology 2030
La Rovere et al. 2013 Scenario A Hypothetical and counterfactual 2030
La Rovere et al. 2013 Scenario B Current policy scenario 2030
La Rovere et al. 2013 Scenario C New policy scenario 2030
International Energy Agency 2012 ETP 6˚C Scenario Global temperature 2050
International Energy Agency 2012 ETP 4˚C Scenario Global temperature 2050
International Energy Agency 2012 ETP 2˚C Scenario Global temperature 2050
Energy Research Company 2013 10-year Energy Plan 2022 Current policy scenario 2022
Greenpeace 2013 Energy revolution Global temperature 2050
International Energy Agency 2014 WEO CPS Current policy scenario 2040
International Energy Agency 2014 WEO NPS New policy scenario 2040
International Energy Agency 2014 WEO 450ppm Global temperature 2040
Lucena et al. 2015 Core baseline scenario Current policy scenario 2050
Lucena et al. 2015 Carbon tax New policy scenario 2050
Lucena et al. 2015 Abatement New policy scenario 2050
Source: adapted by the authors based on various scenarios.
MtCO
2
e or 16 percent below the projected trend line of 975 Mt CO
2
e 
for that same year.
McKinsey (2009) utilized marginal abatement cost curves 
(MACC) to produce low-carbon pathways for all domestic sectors 
until 2030. The key opportunities for further emissions reduction 
potential in Brazil are identified as road transport (69 MtCO
2
e) 
through modal shift, steel (50 MtCO
2
e), chemicals (33MtCO
2
e), oil 
and gas (20 MtCO
2
e), and cement (16 MtCO
2
e). It is not a pathway 
study, but can be assumed using linear growths from the base year.
World Bank—De Gouvello et al. (2010) analysis is another 
MACC study, based on the intermediate reference scenario from 
the National Energy Plan (PNE) 2030, which assumes an average 
economic growth rate for Brazil. GHG emissions in 2030 could 
be reduced to 815 million tons of CO
2
e or 16 percent below the 
projected trend line of 975 Mt CO
2
e in 2030 (using a baseline of 
500 Mt CO
2
e in 2010). The mitigation potential refers to reductions 
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of carbon emissions arising from the change from the Reference 
Scenario to a Low-Carbon Scenario (by analyzing the mitigation 
options not deeply considered in the PNE 2030, such as hybrid cars, 
carbon capture and storage, among others).
The Brazil BAU (2010) considers only implemented and adopted 
policies in Brazil, and adopts the annual Ten-Year Energy Plan as the 
sectoral plan for mitigation and adaptation in the energy sector. Pro-
jected 2020 emissions (643 MtCO
2
e) fall within the range pledged 
by the NAMA (634–680 MtCO
2
e); however, projected GHG intensity 
per unit GDP and per unit of energy consumed both slightly exceed 
2005 levels. (Brazil’s climate policy dictates that these figures 
should not exceed 2005 levels.) 
The Energy Technology Perspectives – ETP (2012) taskforce 
from the International Energy Agency (IEA) defined three scenarios 
for the Brazilian Energy sector, consistent with pathways leading to 
increased average temperatures of 2°C, 4°C, and 6°C respectively 
by 2100. The business-as-usual representative pathway leads to 
an increase in global average temperature of +6°C, while the 2°C 
scenario presents an emissions trajectory consistent with the IEA 
WEO 450 scenario, and details the new developments in energy 
technology necessary to achieve the objectives of limiting the global 
temperature rise to 2°C and enhancing energy security. The study 
projects that, even after compliance with the Brazilian Nationally Ap-
propriated Mitigation Actions (NAMAs)—the voluntary pledges that 
Brazil announced in 2009 during COP15—the proposed emissions 
reductions would not be enough to keep within the 2°C trajectory, 
and would even stay above the 6°C trajectory (Figure 1).
La Rovere et al. (2013) show the energy sector as the biggest 
growing source of emissions for Brazil post-2020 and present 
projections based on existing policies and more ambitious policies. 
Scenario A is counterfactual and based on no further renewable 
energy growth, that is, it excluded any expansion of generation 
capacities based on renewable sources (including large hydropower 
plants) as of 2010. For Scenario B, the energy sources mix was 
taken from the 2019 Ten-Year Energy Plan (PDE 2019). The energy 
mix for the period 2020–2030 was determined through the evolution 
outlined in PNE 2030. Scenario C was constructed by including 
additional mitigation options not included in Scenario B, such 
as hybrid cars, and carbon capture and storage, among others. 
Advanced strategies are similar to those from the World Bank’s 
study.
Greenpeace (2013) considers that GHG emissions from the 
energy sector are 358 MtCO2e in 2010, reach 512 MtCO2e in 2020, 
then reduce to 312 mtCO
2
e by 2050. The scenario is based on five 
premises: decentralized and integrated renewable solutions; respect 
for environmental impacts when building new projects; gradual 
phase-out of fossil fuels and nuclear power; better distribution of 
the use of energy and natural resources; and decoupling economic 
growth from consumption of fossil fuels. Such goals require many 
policy changes, including (i) elimination of all subsidies to fossil 
fuels and nuclear; (ii) internalizing socio-environmental impact 
costs by means of carbon taxes or social indicators; (iii) rigorous 
efficiency standards for appliances, vehicles, and buildings, plus 
labeling schemes and awareness-raising campaigns; (iv) regulatory 
frameworks for new renewable-energy sources, including access to 
the grid; (v) feed-in tariffs and fair minimum energy-auction prices 
for renewables; (vi) financing R&D for renewables and efficiency. 
The IEA’s World Energy Outlook WEO (2014) includes the 
Current Policies Scenario (CPS), which takes into account only 
policies and measures affecting energy markets that were formally 
enacted as of mid-2014. It both illustrates the consequences of 
inaction and makes it possible to evaluate the potential effectiveness 
of recent developments in energy and climate policy (IEA, 2014). 
Lucena et al. (2015) is a more recent reference. Without showing 
pathways, it models the effects of market-based mechanisms and 
carbon-emission restrictions on the energy sector and compares six 
models under different scenarios for carbon taxes and abatement 
targets up to 2050. The results show an increase in GHG emissions 
in the baseline scenarios because of the increasing penetration of 
coal and natural gas. Nevertheless, climate policy scenarios indicate 
that high carbon taxes (roughly 50 USD/tCO
2
e in 2020 rising to 
162 USD/tCO
2
e in 2050) can lead to GHG emissions reductions of 
around 60 percent. In a 2050 horizon, core baselines range from 
0.9 to 1.6 Gt CO
2
e. Most of the emissions after mitigation efforts 
range  around 0.8 Gt CO
2
e (Low C price); and 0.3-0.4 GtCO
2
e (20% 
and 50% fossil fuel abatement scenarios). Despite the many models 
and pathways displayed, a 40-year span cumulative emissions can 
be easily estimated: 14 to 24 GtCO
2
e (from the 0.4 GtCO
2
e in 2010 
to the final values ranging 0.3-0.8 Gt CO
2
e in 2050). These results 
corroborate the recommendations made hereafter. 
According to the baseline scenarios, emissions intensities (that is, 
emissions per unit of GDP and per unit of energy consumed) are 
projected to be higher at the end of the time horizon, because of 
increased energy consumption as a result of population growth and 
increased affluence, relatively lower penetration of renewables in 
the energy mix (low decarbonization), and no projected increase in 
energy efficiency. The non-reference scenarios assume more conser-
vative population and GDP growth rates than those assumed in the 
PNE 2030, as do the scenarios of the IEA WEO 2014 (CPS, NPS, and 
450ppm), Greenpeace (2013), and IEA ETP (2°C, 4°C, and 6°C).
According to Greenpeace (2013), projections of energy demand are 
normally subject to three main factors: population growth, which 
determines the number of consumers; economic growth, for which 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is the most common indicator; 
and the amount of energy required to produce one unit of GDP 
(measured by energy intensity indicators and price elasticity of 
electricity demand (Greenpeace, 2013).
Greenpeace does not support low-carbon technologies such as 
carbon capture and storage (CCS), and indicates that the neces-
sary GHG emissions reductions will be made possible by replacing 
thermal-power plants with non-fossil-fuel power plants to expand 
energy supply. It also assumes the widespread use of biofuels and 
electricity for light vehicles, the reduction of fossil sources in in-
dustry, strong measures on energy efficiency in all sectors, and the 
diffusion of technologies to store energy (Greenpeace, 2013).
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Table A1-2  |  Macroeconomic Assumptions Underlying the Scenarios
SCENARIO
 
GDP GROWTH POPULATION
EXCLUDING 
SOME EXISTING 
POLICIES IN 
PLACE
La Rovere et al. (2013) Scenario A
5 percent until 2020
4 percent (2021–2030)
Based on official projections (EPE, 2009)
220.1 mm in 2020
238.5 mm in 2030
CURRENT 
POLICIES
National Energy Plan 2030
Ten-year Energy Plan 2022
5 percent until 2020
4 percent (2021–2030)
220.1 mm in 2020
238.5 mm in 2030
La Rovere et al. (2013) Scenario B
5 percent until 2020
4 percent (2021–2030)
Based on official projections (EPE, 2009)
World Bank (2010)
Reference Scenario
$USD 1.38 trillion in 2020
$USD 2.13 trillion in 2030
 
IEA WEO 2014 (CPS)
 
2.9 percent (2012–2020)
4.0 percent (2020–2030)
3.3 percent (2030–2040)
3.4 percent (2012–2040)
0.5 percent annual growth rate (2012–2040)
229 million in 2040
90 percent urbanization in 2040
MOST COST-
EFFECTIVE 
ABATEMENT 
TECHNOLOGY
McKinsey - Base Case
 
  Not mentioned
World Bank (2010)
Low-Carbon Scenario
   
NEW POLICIES
La Rovere et al. (2013) Scenario C
 
5 percent until 2020
4 percent (2021–2030)
Based on official projections  
(EPE, 2009)
IEA WEO (2014) NPS
2.9 percent (2012–2020)
4.0 percent (2020–2030)
3.3 percent (2030–2040)
3.4 percent (2012–2040)
0.5 percent annual growth rate (2012–2040)
229 million in 2040
90 percent urbanization in 2040
GLOBAL 
TEMPERATURE
IEA ETP 4°C
IEA ETP 6°C
IEA ETP 2°C
 
3.4 percent (2009–2050)
3.4 percent (2009–2050)
3.4 percent (2009–2050)
Not mentioned
Greenpeace (2013)
 
3.7 percent (2011–2015)
3.5 percent (2016–2020)
2.5 percent (2021–2050)
0.64 percent annual growth rate (2011–2035)
223 mm (million of people) in 2050
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Table A1-3  |  Key Assumptions Underlying the Scenarios and Implications for the Carbon Budget
SCENARIOS NOT CONSISTENT  
WITH CARBON BUDGET
SCENARIOS CONSISTENT  
WITH CARBON BUDGET
Energy consumption
705-792 TWh in 2020
933-1144 TWh in 2030
1156-1267 in 2040
679 TWh in 2020
872 TWh in 2030
1058 TWh 2040
Share of renewables in 
electricity consumption
Share of renewables capacity: 48 percent~73 percent
165 GW or 65 percent hydro capacity in 2030
81 percent hydro in power generation
Higher share of renewables capacity: 85 percent
187~197 GW in 2030
140 GW hydro capacity in 2030 (64 percent)
22 GW wind capacity in 2030
Industry sector
Steel and chemicals as most intensive sector 
Replacing charcoal from deforestation with renewable 
plantations
Enhanced energy efficiency standards
Higher rate of recycling
Transportation sector Ethanol and biodiesel blending mandate
Fuel efficiency improvements 
Enhanced support for alternative fuels 
Half of energy needs met with biofuels
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To limit the average global temperature increase to 2°C by the end 
of the century, cumulative global CO
2
 emissions should stay within 
a “budget” of approximately 990 (510–1505) GtCO
2
 over the period 
2012–2100 (IPCC, 2013). Scientists estimate that, ideally, global 
CO
2
 emissions will need to reach net zero between 2050 and 2070 
(UNEP, 2014) and should become negative over the remainder of the 
century to offset previous emissions and ongoing emissions from 
non-CO
2
 gases. Global GHG emissions will need to reach net zero 
between 2080 and 2100 (IPCC, 2013).
Under current trends, this budget will be exhausted within the next 
30 years, so immediate reductions in global emissions are neces-
sary. The question of how much Brazil should contribute to the 
necessary global reduction was not addressed by the IPCC, and is 
fundamentally a political question. This Annex presents some of the 
literature that could be used to determine Brazil’s economy-wide 
“fair share.” The literature covers approaches including historical 
responsibility, ethical allocation including rights of future genera-
tions, economic capability, and least possible cost. 
Kanitkar et al. (2010) and Höhne and Moltmann (2009) present a 
range of possible allocations of the carbon budget per country, in-
cluding: (i) a budget for the 2010–2050 period with allocation based 
on the entitlements; (ii) a budget for the 2010-2050 period based 
on per capita allocation by 2000 population (known as the “German 
Budget Proposal”), and (iii) a gap (overdrawn entitlements*) defining 
financial and technology transfers.
In particularly, Höhne and Moltmann (2009) present allocations 
based on the following approaches:
 ▪ Greenhouse Development Rights (GDRs): All countries reduce 
emissions below their business-as-usual path based on their 
responsibility (cumulative emissions) and capacity (GDP); only 
emissions and GDP of the population above a development 
threshold counts toward responsibility and capability. 
 ▪ Contraction and Convergence (C&C): Targets for individual 
countries are set in such a way that per capita emission allow-
ances converge from the countries’ current levels to a level equal 
for all countries within a given period, from the present until 
2050. 
 ▪ Common but Differentiated Convergence (CDC): Targets are set 
so per capita emissions for all countries converge to an equal 
level over the period 2010 to 2050. For developed (Kyoto Proto-
col Annex I) countries’ per capita emission allowances conver-
gence starts immediately. For individual non-Annex I countries’ 
per capita emissions convergence starts from the date when their 
per capita emissions reach a certain percentage threshold of the 
(gradually declining) global average.
ANNEX 2. CARBON BUDGETS AND COUNTRY ALLOCATIONS
Table A2-1 presents possible budgets for Brazil, based on a review 
of existing studies covering all countries. From these cases, the 
most generous budget for Brazil would be 41.4 Gt CO
2
e and the 
most stringent, 19.8 Gt CO
2
e. Most of the prognostics range be-
tween 20 and 30 Gt CO
2
e, meaning that average emissions per year 
would be between 0.5 and 0.75 Gt CO
2
e.
 
The International Energy Agency‘s World Energy Outlook 2013 
(IEA, 2014) identifies an upper limit for Brazil’s energy-related GHG 
emissions of approximately 23 GtCO
2
e over a 40-year period from 
2010 to 2050.
The Climate Equity Reference Calculator and the Climate  
Equity Pledge Scorecard are equity reference tools to elucidate  
national responsibility and capacity for climate action, and to 
determine each country’s fair share of the global climate effort, 
on both the mitigation and adaptation sides. The tools have been 
developed by EcoEquity and the Stockholm Environment Institute, 
and serve as an equity reference framework to enable analysis of a 
broader range of possible conceptions of responsibility, capacity, 
and fair shares. According to the tool, under a strong two degrees 
scenario (2DS), and considering historical emissions to 1850, 
Brazil´s target for annual emissions in 2030 should be below 1 
GtCO
2
e (EcoEquity and the Stockholm Environment Institute, 2015).
Based on different analysis of equity allocation for mitigation efforts, 
the Brazilian Climate Observatory (OC) also "indicated" what Brazil’s 
target should be from a top-down perspective consistent with two 
degrees and fair share, and proposed a target below 1 GtCO
2
e total 
emissions for Brazil in 2030 (Observatorio do Clima, 2015).
Figure A2-1 translates the pathways presented in Figure 5 into 
cumulative emissions and compares them to the 2010 to 2050 
carbon budget here discussed. This comparison suggests that, 
while there is significant scope for abatement based on current, 
cost-effective technologies, only the most aggressive scenarios, 
which envision new, cutting-edge CO
2
 removal technologies, are 
compatible with a budget that would limit the global temperature 
increase to 2°C by the end of the century. Illustrative extrapolations 
show how few scenarios fall within a theoretical budget (for energy 
only) of 25 gigatonnes of CO
2
 until 2050. 
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Table A2-1  |  Possible Carbon Budgets for Brazil in Non-LUC Sectors
BRAZIL GTCO2E 
Total entitlementsa 1850-2050 65.2
Occupationb 1850-2009 10.6
Occupation 1970-2009 13.6
Occupation (BAU, all exc. LUC, Decree 7390/2010) 2010-2020 14.0
Occupation (max NAMA mitigation, all exc. LUC, Decree 7390/2010) 2010-2020 12.7
Future entitlements 2010-2050; base 1850 54.6
Future entitlements 2010-2050; base 1970 51.6
Allocationc (TISS-DSF ScenA) 2010-2050; base 1850 (Annex I 1990 levels cut 48 percent by 2020; 97 percent by 2050) 19.8
Allocation (TISS-DSF ScenA) 2010-2050; base 1850 (Annex I 1990 levels cut 63 percent by 2020; 99 percent by 2050) 21.1
Allocation (TISS-DSF ScenA) 2010-2050; base 1970 (Annex I 1990 levels cut 48 percent by 2020; 97 percent by 2050) 29.6
Allocation (TISS-DSF ScenA) 2010-2050; base 1970 (Annex I 1990 levels cut 63 percent by 2020; 99 percent by 2050) 41.4
Allocation (WWF-Ecofys CDC max) 2010-2050 22.0
Allocation (WWF-Ecofys GDR max) 2010-2050 25.0
Allocation (WWF-Ecofys C&C max) 2010-2050 26.0
IEA (World Energy Outlook 2013) 2010-2050 23
Climate Equity Reference Calculator (emissions by 2030)
Below 1.0 per 
year by 2030
Climate Observatory (emissions by 2030)
Below 1.0 per 
year by 2030
Sources: Kanitkar et al, 2010; Höhne and Moltmann, 2009; Observatório do Clima, 2015; IEA, 2013; and EcoEquity and the Stockholm Environment Institute.
a Kanitkar et al. use the term ‘entitlement’ to refer to the fair share of emissions that a region/country will be allowed in a given time-period. 
b Occupation: Contribution to global carbon stock in a given time-period.
c Allocation of the carbon budget for Brazil.
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Within 25Gt budget
IEA WEO 2013 NPS
IEA ETP 2012  +4°C
IEA ETP 2012  +2°C
Greenpeace 2013
IEA WEO 2013 450
Brazil BAU 2010 
La Rovere 2011 (A) 
La Rovere 2011 (B)
La Rovere 2011 (C)
WB 2010
McKinsey 2009
EPE PDE2023 PNE2030 
IEA ETP 2012  +6°C
IEA WEO 2013 CPS
Over 25Gt budget
*  Budget range for all sectors: 19.8-41.4 GtCO
2
e in 40 years (models TISS-DSF, WWF-Ecofys, and GAMS). Energy budget 25 GtCO
2
e based on 60 GtCO
2
e (future 
entitlements) minus non-energy GHGs (~0.85 GtCO
2
e in 2010 multiplied by 40 years).
Figure A2-1  |   Screening of CO2 Emission Outlooks Considering a 25 Billion  
Tonnes of CO2 40-year Carbon Budget for Brazil
WRI.org        84
ABOUT WRI
World Resources Institute is a global research organization that 
turns big ideas into action at the nexus of environment, economic 
opportunity and human well-being. 
Our Challenge
Natural resources are at the foundation of economic opportunity and 
human well-being. But today, we are depleting Earth’s resources at 
rates that are not sustainable, endangering economies and people’s 
lives. People depend on clean water, fertile land, healthy forests, and 
a stable climate. Livable cities and clean energy are essential for a 
sustainable planet. We must address these urgent, global challenges 
this decade.
Our Vision
We envision an equitable and prosperous planet driven by the wise 
management of natural resources. We aspire to create a world where 
the actions of government, business, and communities combine to 
eliminate poverty and sustain the natural environment for all people.
Our Approach
COUNT IT
We start with data. We conduct independent research and draw on the 
latest technology to develop new insights and recommendations. Our 
rigorous analysis identifies risks, unveils opportunities, and informs 
smart strategies. We focus our efforts on influential and emerging 
economies where the future of sustainability will be determined.
CHANGE IT
We use our research to influence government policies, business 
strategies, and civil society action. We test projects with communities, 
companies, and government agencies to build a strong evidence 
base. Then, we work with partners to deliver change on the ground 
that alleviates poverty and strengthens society. We hold ourselves 
accountable to ensure our outcomes will be bold and enduring.
SCALE IT
We don’t think small. Once tested, we work with partners to adopt 
and expand our efforts regionally and globally. We engage with 
decision-makers to carry out our ideas and elevate our impact. We 
measure success through government and business actions that 
improve people’s lives and sustain a healthy environment.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors are grateful for the contributions of many individuals 
who helped shape this report, especially Dr. José Goldemberg, from 
the University of São Paulo, who provided invaluable insights and 
technical contributions from inception to publication. The report was 
also significantly informed by the views of experts from a range of 
sectors and institutions who participated in several events we con-
vened to discuss our research. These experts include Sérgio Pacca, 
University of São Paulo; Karen Coppe, Ministry of the Environment; 
André Ferretti, Fundação Boticário; Carlos Rittl, Observatório do 
Clima; Gabriela Couto, independent consultant; Juliana Simões, 
Instituto Ethos; Marcelo Poppe, Center for Strategic Studies and 
Management in Science, Technology and Innovation (CGEE); and 
Emílio La Rovere, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro and MAPS/
IES Brasil.
The report was further strengthened by detailed peer review by 
Jacques Marcovitch, University of São Paulo; Laura Valente, inde-
pendent consultant; Roberto Schaeffer, Federal University of Rio de 
Janeiro; Tasso Azevedo, independent consultant; Virgínia Parente, 
University of São Paulo; Craig Hanson, WRI; Davida Wood, WRI; 
Jennifer Morgan, WRI; Laura Malaguzzi, WRI; Pankaj Bhatia, WRI; 
Priya Barua, WRI; Rachel Biderman, WRI; and Walter Vergara, WRI.
Additionally, the following individuals capably supported the 
editing and publication process: Emily Matthews, Hyacinth Billings, 
Courtney Durham, Carni Klirs, Julie Moretti, Allison Meyer, Rhys 
Gerholdt, and Elyse Myrans. 
Finally, funding from the International Policies and Politics Initiative 
(IPPI) made this analysis possible. 
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Oswaldo Lucon is a climate change adviser to the São Paulo 
State Government, an invited lecturer at the Institute of Energy and 
Environment, University of São Paulo (IEE/USP) and member of the 
Research Center on Carbon Emission Policy and Regulation (NUP-
PREC/IEE/USP).
Contact: oswaldolucon@gmail.com
Viviane Romeiro is a Policy Associate with the Climate Program 
at WRI Brazil and member of the Research Center on Carbon Emis-
sion Policy and Regulation (NUPPREC/IEE/USP).
Contact: vromeiro@wri.org
Taryn Fransen is a Senior Associate with the Climate Program at 
WRI, and the Director of the Open Climate Network.
Contact: tfransen@wri.org
ABOUT OCN
The Open Climate Network (OCN) brings together independent 
research institutes and stakeholder groups to monitor countries’ 
progress on climate change. We seek to accelerate the transition to a 
low-emission, climate-resilient future by providing consistent, cred-
ible information that enhances accountability both among and within 
countries. www.openclimatenetwork.org
        85Bridging the Gap Between Energy and Climate Policies in Brazil
Copyright 2015 World Resources Institute. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.  
To view a copy of the license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
Each World Resources Institute report represents a timely, scholarly treatment of a subject of public concern. WRI takes responsibility for choosing 
the study topics and guaranteeing its authors and researchers freedom of inquiry. It also solicits and responds to the guidance of advisory panels 
and expert reviewers. Unless otherwise stated, however, all the interpretation and findings set forth in WRI publications are those of the authors.
PHOTO CREDITS 
Cover photo National Renewable Energy Lab; table of contents, pg. 
62 The Danish Wind Industry Association; pg. iv, 36 Lance Cheung; 
pg. vi, 44, 48 (right) World Bank Photo Collection; pg. 4, 29, 33 
(right) WRI Brasil Cidades Sustentáveis; pg. 6 (left) Milton Jung, pg. 
7 (center) Will De Freitas, pg. 7 (right) Disclosure; pg. 10 CIFOR; 
pg. 16 connectionconsulting; pg. 20 . Shell; pg. 25 Sarah Murray; 
pg. 28 (left) Fernando Stankuns; pg. 32 (left), 33 (center) Sweeter 
Alternative; pg. 38 Wilfredo Rodríguez; pg. 45 (right) Programa de 
Aceleração do Crescimento; pg. 47 Asian Development Bank; pg. 48 
(left) Deni Williams, pg. 52 OneEighteen; pg. 55 Fernando Pangaré; 
pg. 56 Boneysp.
WRI.org        86
10 G STREET NE 
SUITE 800
WASHINGTON, DC 20002, USA
+1 (202) 729-7600
WWW.WRI.ORG ISBN 978-1-56973-871-9
